Policies·br_ii_pnd_1974

II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (Brazil, 1974-1979)

BRA·1974 – 1979·enacted 1974-12-10candidate

movessectoral subsidy↑spending level↑sectoral licensing↑trade openness↓

What the policy did

II PND (Lei 6151 de 1974) set a USD ~150bn five-year programme focused on capital goods, steel, non-ferrous metals, petrochemicals, fertilisers, nuclear, hydroelectric, and transport infrastructure. Financed via external petrodollar borrowing and state-enterprise capitalisation (BNDE, Eletrobras, Petrobras, Siderbrás). Deepened ISI into capital-goods stage.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · strong

expanded sectoral subsidies

↑

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

increased · strong

higher spending share

↑

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

increased · moderate

tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating

↓

trade openness

regulatory.trade_openness

Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.

decreased · moderate

more protectionist

Enacted by

brazil_geisel_abertura_1974_1979

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved higher long-run real per-capita GDP growth over 1960-2019 than otherwise-comparable countries starting at similar income levels in 1960.

industrial_policy_developmentalist_states_growthinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.sectoral_licensingfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

SUPPORTED — avg ATT across 4 developmentalist cases (KOR/TWN/SGP/CHN) is +1.088 log-points at 40-yr horizon (~+197%). 4/4 cases above the 30 log-point threshold…

supported

Across a broad panel of countries 1960-2019, higher trade openness predicts faster long-run convergence of real GDP per capita toward the global frontier (the United States) than industrial-policy intensity does.

trade_openness_long_run_income_convergenceinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+6.729e-18, p=0.00881; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.trade_openness

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.

consumer_choice_variety_trade_market_reforminferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'competition_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Lula third-term's Nova Indústria Brasil 2024 industrial-policy package, conditioned on export performance and technology-diffusion metrics, produces measurable sectoral capability gains (semiconductors, green hydrogen, health-industrial complex) by 2030 — replicating the East Asian export-discipline conditionality pattern rather than the earlier Latin American import-substitution-industrialisation pattern.

nova_industria_brasil_export_discipline_pattern_effectinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.

welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred

viafiscal.spending_levelregulatory.trade_openness

PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Industrialising industries strategy

DZA·1967

match

2.7

spending levelsectoral subsidytrade openness

Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP I)

ETH·2010

match

2.7

sectoral subsidyspending levelsectoral licensing

Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II)

ETH·2015