Policies·co_cali_cartel_dismantling_1995

Cali Cartel dismantling 1995-1996

COL·1995 – 1996candidate

What the policy did

Colombian National Police, supported by DEA, captured the Cali Cartel leadership during 1995-1996: Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela (9 June 1995), Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela (6 August 1995), José Santacruz Londoño (4 July 1995, killed March 1996 after escape), and Helmer "Pacho" Herrera (September 1996). Hélmer Buitrago and other mid-level leaders followed. Cali Cartel vertically integrated structure dismantled; fragmented into smaller "cartelitos" that emerged as 1990s successor organisations.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

rule of law

institutional.rule_of_law

Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.

increased · moderate

stronger rule of law

Enacted by

colombia_samper_liberal_1994_1998

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).

bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).

latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_gdp_pc_growth_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=-0.08348, p=0.913 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_high_tech_exports_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=+0.621, p=0.746 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_investment_share_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=-0.3477, p=0.814 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_private_credit_depth_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=+4.153, p=0.513 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

El Salvador's second Bukele term (post-2024 inauguration, with continued régimen-de-excepción and worsening institutional-quality scores) maintains FDI inflows, GDP growth, and tourism arrivals trajectories established in 2019-2024 despite mounting authoritarianism critique (V-Dem electoral-democracy decline, WGI rule-of-law score continuing to fall, Freedom House "partly free" downgrade).

bukele_phase2_post_2024_authoritarian_growth_premiuminferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.3577, |gap|/pre_sd=0.051, p_perm=0.143 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.

contract_enforcement_fdi_productivity_spilloversinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.1145 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0196

supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Repeal of Punto Final + Obediencia Debida laws 2003-2005

Juicio a las Juntas (Argentina, 1985)

Belgium three-stage federalisation (1980, 1988, 1993)

BEL·1980