IESET.
Policies·hu_crawling_peg_exchange_regime_1995

Hungarian crawling-peg exchange regime 1995-2001

HUN·1995 – 2001·enacted 1995-03-16candidate
movescentral bank independence↑

What the policy did

Pre-announced crawling-peg regime (initial 1.9%/month, tapering to 0.3%/month by 2001) replaced ad hoc devaluations. Nominal anchor for disinflation; ended 2001 with switch to inflation-targeting band.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
increased · moderate
greater independence (legal, operational, personnel)
Pre-announced peg schedule anchored expectations.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.
unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …
supported
UK Truss mini-budget 2022 gilt crisis reflected market confidence and institutional-framework rupture rather than an MMT-predicted hard fiscal limit, because the BoE restored order by intervening as issuer.
uk_truss_mini_budget_currency_sovereign_mechanisminferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
partial — Both mechanism legs are directionally consistent but at least one fails the SUPPORTED threshold: FX leg holds (5.02% trough decline); yield leg partia…
partial
The September 2022 UK gilt-market dysfunction had its operative amplification mechanism in the foreign-currency-collateral exposure of the Liability-Driven Investment (LDI) leveraged-derivative chain in the UK pension system, not in a "fiscal limit" reached by the sovereign issuer.
truss_2022_currency_user_ldi_collateral_mechanisminferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['boe:IUDLG7N', 'boe:IUDMNZC', 'boe:gilt_volatility (manual); ice:UK_gilt_options', 'fred:DEXUS…
run pending
Across countries 1990-2023, higher de jure and de facto central-bank independence predicts lower mean CPI inflation and lower inflation volatility, conditional on a basic set of controls (exchange-rate regime, trade openness, fiscal balance, initial inflation level).
central_bank_independence_inflation_disciplineinferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
PARTIAL — coef=+9.05e-17, p=0.747; effect magnitude effectively zero
partial
UK GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) diverged negatively from a matched synthetic counterfactual of similar-income anglophone/developed economies (USA, CAN, AUS, NZL, DEU, NLD, CHE) starting around 2008 and widening post-2016 (Brexit referendum).
uk_economic_decline_multi_movementinferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'uk_post_2008' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Every documented hyperinflation episode since 1900 (Weimar Germany, post-WW2 Hungary, Yugoslavia 1990s, Zimbabwe 2000s, Venezuela 2010s-2020s, among others) was preceded by fiscal dominance — a state of affairs where monetary policy is subordinated to financing government deficits that cannot be financed by taxation or market-rate borrowing.
hyperinflation_requires_fiscal_dominanceinferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['hanke:hyperinflation_table']
run pending
Argentine monthly CPI inflation declines from its late-2023 peak (around 25% month-on-month in December 2023 following the 54% peso devaluation) to below 5% month-on-month within 12 months of Milei's December 2023 inauguration, and below 3% month-on- month within 18 months.
milei_reforms_reduce_argentine_inflationinferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING - INDEC IPC Nacional vintage missing from local data/vintages; expected indec:148.3_INIVELNAL_DICI_M_26 (indec:148.3_INIVELNAL_DICI_M_…
run pending
Japan post-1990 has run gross public-debt-to-GDP ratios from ~70% rising to ~250%, the highest sustained level in the OECD record, WITHOUT triggering inflation, currency collapse, sovereign-spread blowout, or fiscal-dominance-induced loss of monetary control.
fiscal_dominance_japan_debt_non_crisisinferred
viamonetary.central_bank_independence
INCONCLUSIVE_PENDING_DATA
run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Convertibility Plan (Plan Cavallo) — Argentina 1991-2002
ARG·1991
match
0.8
central bank independence
Austrian Hartwährungspolitik — schilling peg to DM 1976
AUT·1976
match
0.8
central bank independence
Hawke-Keating reform package (1983-1996)
AUS·1983
match
0.8
central bank independence
Hawke-Keating market reforms — Australia 1983-1996
AUS·1983
match
0.8
central bank independence
New Economic Policy — Decree 21060 (Bolivia stabilisation 1985)
BOL·1985
match
0.8
central bank independence
Banco Central Autonomy — Lei Complementar 179/2021
BRA·2021
match
0.8
central bank independence
Brazil inflation-targeting adoption (Decreto 3.088/1999)
BRA·1999
match
0.8
central bank independence
Plano Real — Brazil monetary stabilisation 1994
BRA·1994
match
0.8
central bank independence

References