IESET.
Policies·id_corruption_eradication_commission_kpk_2002

Indonesia Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law (2002)

IDN·2002 2003·enacted 2002-12-27·PDI-P coalitioncandidate
movesrule of lawjudicial independence

What the policy did

Law 30/2002 on Corruption Eradication Commission enacted 27 December 2002, effective December 2003 with first commissioners appointed. KPK armed with investigative, prosecutorial, and preventive powers over corruption involving state losses exceeding Rp 1bn or high-profile officials. Key design features: five-commissioner collegial structure, budget independence, wiretap authority, non-renewable 4-year terms, subordinate Corruption Court (Pengadilan Tipikor). Conviction rate ~100% at original Tipikor 2004-2011; flagship cases included ministers, speaker, BI deputy governors. Powers curtailed by 2019 revision (Law 19/2019) under Jokowi.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
increased · strong
stronger rule of law
Independent anti-corruption agency with prosecutorial, investigative and preventive powers.
judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
increased · moderate
stronger judicial independence
Separate Tipikor adjudication track insulated corruption trials from general judiciary.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).
latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)
partial
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).
bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Stronger rule-of-law proxies strengthen quality-of-life and income outcomes under market institutions.
judicial_independence_market_qolinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
PARTIAL — coef=+868, p=0.174 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_judicial_effectiveness_gdp_pc_ppp_current_gapinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
SUPPORTED — top-vs-bottom gap has expected sign + and Welch p=2.72e-13
supported
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_judicial_effectiveness_investment_share_current_gapinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=1.933, p=0.2924)
partial
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
heritage_judicial_effectiveness_investment_share_income_region_robustnessinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=-0.08458, p=0.9175)
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_judicial_effectiveness_private_consumption_pc_current_gapinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
SUPPORTED — top-vs-bottom gap has expected sign + and Welch p=3.854e-13
supported
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
heritage_judicial_effectiveness_private_consumption_pc_income_region_robustnessinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence
SUPPORTED — controlled market-score coefficient has expected sign + and p=3.265e-09
supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References