IESET.
Policies·co_constitution_1991

Constitución Política de Colombia 1991

COL·1991 ·enacted 1991-07-04candidate
movesrule of lawjudicial independenceproperty rightscentral bank independence

What the policy did

Promulgated 4 July 1991 by the Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente) with Liberal, AD M-19, Movimiento de Salvación Nacional co-presidency. Replaced the 1886 Constitution. Established Corte Constitucional (Art. 239), acción de tutela (Art. 86) for fundamental-rights protection, Defensoría del Pueblo, Fiscalía General de la Nación, autonomous Banco de la República (Art. 371), direct-democracy mechanisms (referendum, plebiscite, revocatoria del mandato, cabildo abierto), multicultural- nation definition, ban on extradition of nationals (repealed 1997), departmentalisation reform.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
increased · strong
stronger rule of law
judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
increased · strong
stronger judicial independence
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
increased · moderate
stronger property rights
Acción de tutela-protected fundamental rights include property-adjacent protections.
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
increased · strong
greater independence (legal, operational, personnel)

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).
bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.
zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING
run pending
Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).
latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independenceinstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)
partial
Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.
land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.
post_soviet_transition_institutional_variationinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — coef=-3.693e-10, p=0.719 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
market_order_rule_of_law_investment_share_panelinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — coef=-0.3477, p=0.814 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References