IESET.
Policies·id_jokowi_omnibus_job_creation_2020

Omnibus Law on Job Creation (UU Cipta Kerja) 2020

IDN·2020 present·enacted 2020-11-02·PDI-P-led KIM+ super-coalitioncandidate
moveslabour market flexibilityproduct market competitionenvironmental stringencyrule of law

What the policy did

UU No. 11/2020 (re-enacted as Perppu 2/2022 and UU 6/2023 after a 2021 Constitutional Court ruling of conditional unconstitutionality) revised 79 statutes simultaneously to simplify business licensing, ease foreign-investment entry (revised Negative Investment List to Positive Investment List), weaken severance obligations and minimum- wage rigidity, narrow outsourcing restrictions, and streamline environmental impact assessment. The largest single deregulatory package in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Bundled creation of the OSS single-window licensing system and tax incentives. Generated the largest street protests of Jokowi's second term.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
labour market flexibility
regulatory.labour_market_flexibility
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
increased · strong
more flexible (easier hiring/firing, less rigid bargaining)
Reduced severance cap, new minimum-wage formula tied to GDP/inflation, expanded fixed-term and outsourcing scope.
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · strong
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
OSS single-window, Positive Investment List, consolidated business licensing.
environmental stringency
regulatory.environmental_stringency
Environmental regulation stringency — emissions caps, standards, phase-out mandates, carbon pricing, renewable portfolio standards.
decreased · moderate
less stringent environmental rules
Narrowed AMDAL scope and public-participation requirements.
unintended / side-effect
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · weak · unintended
weaker rule of law
2021 MK ruling of conditional unconstitutionality; re-enactment by Perppu in 2022 bypassed normal legislative process.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.
labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=-7.366e+04, p=0.927 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Strong employment-protection legislation (EPL) with high union wage-setting coverage and limited at-will dismissal produces a three-order causal chain in Southern European labour markets.
strong_union_labour_law_youth_unemployment_south_europeinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityinstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — coef=+2.943, p=0.252 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Countries with stricter employment protection legislation — measured by the OECD EPL indicator (or comparable alternatives where OECD EPL is missing) — experience longer average unemployment duration, holding other controls constant.
labour_market_flexibility_unemployment_durationinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise …
run pending
In a broad-country panel 1990-2019, greater labour-market flexibility — measured by lower OECD EPL overall strictness, higher ease-of-hiring scores, and absence of centralized wage bargaining — predicts higher employment-to- population ratios and faster real GDP per capita growth, controlling for institutional quality, education, and trade openness.
labour_market_flexibility_employment_growth_panelinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — coef=-1.251, p=0.162 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References