De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Across the post-euro entry period, Italian product-market regulation remained restrictive relative to comparator economies on OECD PMR indicators, with persistent retail-licensing controls (the 1998 Bersani decree's effects partially rolled back), professional-services entry caps, restricted shop-opening hours, and concession-driven local public services. Successive Bersani I (2006), Monti, Renzi and Letta liberalisations chipped at specific sectors, but Italy stayed in the upper third of OECD PMR rankings through the late 2010s, contributing to weak productivity growth.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.