De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
Letter of 12 February 1981 from Treasury Minister Beniamino Andreatta to Banca d'Italia Governor Carlo Azeglio Ciampi ending Banca d'Italia's obligation to purchase unsold government paper at Treasury auctions. Converted Banca d'Italia from residual buyer into effective independent monetary authority. Canonical European early-1980s central-bank independence reform. Preceded formal statutory independence by over a decade.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.