Policies·br_amnesty_law_1979

Lei da Anistia (Brazil, 1979)

BRA·1979 – 1979·enacted 1979-08-28candidate

What the policy did

Lei 6683/1979 granted amnesty to political crimes committed 2 September 1961 - 15 August 1979, including bilaterally covering regime agents responsible for torture (the "blanket amnesty" interpretation upheld by STF in ADPF 153/2010). Enabled exile return but entrenched institutional impunity for security services.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

rule of law

institutional.rule_of_law

Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.

increased · moderate

stronger rule of law

Political amnesty opened transition; bilateral coverage is the institutional cost.

Enacted by

brazil_geisel_abertura_1974_1979

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).

bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).

latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_gdp_pc_growth_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=-0.08348, p=0.913 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_high_tech_exports_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=+0.621, p=0.746 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_investment_share_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=-0.3477, p=0.814 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

market_order_rule_of_law_private_credit_depth_panelinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — coef=+4.153, p=0.513 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

El Salvador's second Bukele term (post-2024 inauguration, with continued régimen-de-excepción and worsening institutional-quality scores) maintains FDI inflows, GDP growth, and tourism arrivals trajectories established in 2019-2024 despite mounting authoritarianism critique (V-Dem electoral-democracy decline, WGI rule-of-law score continuing to fall, Freedom House "partly free" downgrade).

bukele_phase2_post_2024_authoritarian_growth_premiuminferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.3577, |gap|/pre_sd=0.051, p_perm=0.143 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.

contract_enforcement_fdi_productivity_spilloversinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.1145 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0196

supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Repeal of Punto Final + Obediencia Debida laws 2003-2005

Juicio a las Juntas (Argentina, 1985)

Belgium three-stage federalisation (1980, 1988, 1993)

BEL·1980