Policies·cl_encaje_capital_controls_1991

Encaje — Chilean unremunerated reserve requirement on capital inflows 1991

CHL·1991 – 1998·enacted 1991-06-17candidate

What the policy did

Banco Central de Chile Acuerdo 1110 of 20 June 1991 and subsequent circulars imposed a 20% (later 30% in 1992) unremunerated reserve requirement on short-term (<1 year) foreign financial inflows, held at BCCh for one year in dollars. Designed to deter short-term speculative capital while preserving FDI. Rate reduced to 10% (June 1998), 0% (September 1998), and formally abolished (April 2001). Much-studied natural experiment in macro-prudential capital-flow management.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

financial deregulation

regulatory.financial_deregulation

Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.

decreased · weak

looser financial regulation

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Major episodes of financial deregulation — the 1999 US Gramm-Leach- Bliley repeal of Glass-Steagall, the 1986 UK Financial Services Act ("Big Bang"), Chile's 1974-1981 banking liberalisation, Sweden's late-1980s credit-market liberalisation, and Japan's 1996-2001 Big Bang — are followed within 10 years by higher-than-baseline incidence of banking crises, measured by the Laeven-Valencia Systemic Banking Crisis Database, and by elevated credit-to-GDP gaps per BIS.

financial_deregulation_crisis_vulnerabilityinferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

SUPPORTED — sign matches claim +, ATT=+0.04145, p=3.34e-07, N=302, treated_countries=8

supported

The 2007-2009 global financial crisis originated in household-debt-financed consumption sustaining aggregate demand despite stagnant real wages, a Minsky-plus-Marx pattern.

gfc_household_debt_wage_stagnation_linkinferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

PARTIAL — coef=-0.01111, p=0; claim direction not auto-inferred

partial

In an OECD panel 2000-2023, increases in OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) stringency and increases in regulatory uncertainty (proxied by year-to-year changes in the OECD PMR sub-indices) are negatively associated with private non-residential investment as a share of GDP, with effects concentrated in capital-intensive long-duration sectors.

hayek_regulatory_uncertainty_investment_chillinginferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

REFUTED — coef=-3.98 (sign opposite claim +), p=0

refuted

In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, mortgage-market liberalisation episodes (abolition of interest-rate caps, reduction of down-payment requirements, privatisation of state mortgage banks, and introduction of securitisation) predict higher homeownership rates, higher residential investment as a share of GDP, and lower housing-rent-to-income ratios, controlling for income growth, demographic structure, and urbanisation.

mortgage_market_liberalisation_homeownership_panelinferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

PARTIAL — coef=+0.972, p=0.606 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

The 1988-1993 Nordic banking crises (Norway 1988-1991, Sweden 1991-1992, Finland 1991-1993) are a canonical post-deregulation credit-boom-bust panel.

banking_crisis_nordic_1991_1993_panelinferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

SUPPORTED

supported

In the Schularick-Taylor cross-country macrohistory panel restricted to the post-1980 era, sustained acceleration of bank credit to the private non-financial sector relative to GDP raises the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis within a five-year forward window.

banking_crisis_schularick_taylor_credit_boom_panel_post1980inferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.001376 (sign matches claim +), p=9.27e-07

supported

Across countries 1990-2020, higher capital-account openness (proxied by EFW area-4 freedom-to-trade-internationally sub- components covering capital controls, plus IMF AREAER-derived binary capital-control intensity where available) predicts higher subsequent 10-year real per-capita GDP growth, conditional on initial income, rule-of-law level, trade openness, and financial- development depth.

liberal_capital_account_openness_growth_premium_panelinferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

PARTIAL — coef=+1.115e-17, p=0.0255; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Liberal democracies experience monotonic positional drift toward larger, more redistributive states across multi-decade horizons.

liberal_democracy_managerial_flywheel_driftinferred

viaregulatory.financial_deregulation

REFUTED — median final drift = -3.00 (13/26 positive, share = 50%). The corpus does not show monotonic statist drift across the liberal-democracy panel.

refuted

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Cepo cambiario — FX controls regime

ARG·2011

match

0.7

financial deregulation

Massa-era stepped devaluations and multi-rate FX regime (2023)

ARG·2023

match

0.7

financial deregulation

Martínez de Hoz financial liberalisation (Argentina, 1977)

ARG·1977