IESET.
Policies·fr_macron_labour_tax_reforms_2017_2019

Macron labour + tax reforms (Ordonnances 2017 + PFU 2018)

FRA·2017 2019candidate
moveslabour market flexibilitytax progressivitytax capitaltax corporate

What the policy did

Ordonnances Travail (Sep 2017) reforming French Code du Travail — capping unfair-dismissal damages, opening to company-level collective bargaining, merging employee-representative bodies; CSG-for-chômage swap (workers pay more CSG, employers less unemployment contribution); wealth tax (ISF) reform to real-estate-only (IFI); PFU flat tax on capital income 30%; corporate tax rate phased reduction 33.3% → 25%. D.3.1 category: centrist-coalition market-oriented content. Outcome: pre-COVID unemployment fall, investment uptick; contested distributional effects (gilets jaunes protests 2018).

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
labour market flexibility
regulatory.labour_market_flexibility
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
increased · moderate
more flexible (easier hiring/firing, less rigid bargaining)
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
decreased · moderate
less progressive (flatter rates, compression, smaller credits)
PFU flat rate; ISF abolition for financial wealth.
tax capital
fiscal.tax_capital
Taxation of capital income (dividends, capital gains, inheritance, wealth). Distinct from corporate rate.
decreased · moderate
lower capital income tax
tax corporate
fiscal.tax_corporate
Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.
decreased · moderate
lower corporate tax burden

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Countries with stricter employment protection legislation — measured by the OECD EPL indicator (or comparable alternatives where OECD EPL is missing) — experience longer average unemployment duration, holding other controls constant.
labour_market_flexibility_unemployment_durationinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibility
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise …
run pending
In a broad-country panel 1990-2019, greater labour-market flexibility — measured by lower OECD EPL overall strictness, higher ease-of-hiring scores, and absence of centralized wage bargaining — predicts higher employment-to- population ratios and faster real GDP per capita growth, controlling for institutional quality, education, and trade openness.
labour_market_flexibility_employment_growth_panelinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibility
PARTIAL — coef=-1.251, p=0.162 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Labour-market flexibility (ease of hiring and firing, low EPL, decentralised wage bargaining) improves long-run employment rates, productivity growth, and GDP per capita only when paired with complementary adjustment institutions: active labour-market policy (retraining, job search assistance), relocation support, or income-smoothing mechanisms (unemployment insurance, portable benefits).
labour_flexibility_security_complementinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityfiscal.tax_capital
PARTIAL — coef=+1.306e-16, p=0.339; effect magnitude effectively zero
partial
Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.
labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibility
PARTIAL — coef=-7.366e+04, p=0.927 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Strong employment-protection legislation (EPL) with high union wage-setting coverage and limited at-will dismissal produces a three-order causal chain in Southern European labour markets.
strong_union_labour_law_youth_unemployment_south_europeinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibility
PARTIAL — coef=+2.943, p=0.252 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Wealth taxes produce a three-order causal chain.
wealth_tax_capital_flight_revenue_yield_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_capitalfiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.tax_corporate
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — FRA not in panel
run pending
At high-income levels (GDP per capita above OECD median), very high tax burdens — defined as total tax revenue above 40% of GDP — predict weaker long-run total factor productivity growth unless paired with unusually high state capacity (top tercile WGI Government Effectiveness) and high labour- market flexibility (top tercile OECD EPL), in an OECD and high-income panel 1980-2020.
tax_burden_frontier_growth_non_linearinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityfiscal.tax_progressivity
PARTIAL — coef=+0.01059, p=0.585 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Labour-market flexibilisation reforms improve unemployment outcomes in countries with strong active-labour-market-policy (ALMP) complementarities (Denmark flexicurity post-1994, Germany Agenda 2010 / Hartz I-IV 2003-2005) but produce inequality increases without commensurate employment gains in countries lacking institutional ALMP infrastructure.
labour_market_reform_almp_complementarity_effectinferred
viaregulatory.labour_market_flexibilityfiscal.tax_progressivity
SUPPORTED — coef=-5.815 (sign matches claim -), p=8.21e-05
supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References

Notes

Migrated from movements/macron_labour_tax_reforms_2017_2019.yaml (action=MERGE). This entity is a single policy/legislation, not a coalition era; reclassified to policies/. Original movement file deleted.