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Policies·india_pli_scheme_continuation_2024_present

India Pli Scheme Continuation 2024 Present

IND·2024 presentcandidate
movestax progressivitysectoral subsidyspending level~product market competition

What the policy did

Under the Modi third-term government, the Production Linked Incentive scheme continues across its 14 priority sectors with revised disbursement schedules, sector-specific extensions for semiconductors and electronics components, and integration with the Bharat Semiconductor Mission. The policy maintains incremental-sales-based incentive payouts and links performance review to value-addition and employment metrics.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
decreased · weak
less progressive (flatter rates, compression, smaller credits)
Producer-side subsidies are regressive in incidence relative to broad-based progressivity reforms.
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · weak
expanded sectoral subsidies
Continued incentive payouts tied to incremental output across 14 sectors.
~
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
mixed · weak
Some sectoral envelopes expanded (semiconductors), while underutilised allocations were re-budgeted.
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · weak
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
New PLI windows for components and semiconductor packaging keep entry contestable.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.spending_level
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Rapid market liberalisation (price decontrol, mass privatisation, trade opening) under weak institutions produces large short-run welfare losses—rising mortality, falling life expectancy, rising inequality, and collapsing output—that may persist for at least a decade, compared to gradual reformers or non-reformers at similar initial income levels.
free_market_shock_therapy_social_costinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.spending_level
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-3.156, |gap|/pre_sd=1.8, p_perm=0.367; claim direction ambiguous
partial
Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.
sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_electricity_access_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=4.491, p=0.2842)
partial
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_account_ownership_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelregulatory.product_market_competition
REFUTED — top-vs-bottom gap has opposite sign and Welch p=2.887e-05
refuted
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_extreme_poverty_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=1.296, p=0.7399)
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_gdp_pc_ppp_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=-9554, p=0.1259)
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.