IESET.
Policies·indonesia_lps_deposit_insurance_2004

Indonesia Lps Deposit Insurance 2004

IDN·1998 presentcandidate
movescentral bank independencefinancial deregulationproduct market competitiontransfer expansion

What the policy did

Law No. 24/2004 established the Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan (LPS), Indonesia's deposit insurance corporation, replacing the post-crisis blanket guarantee with a phased, capped scheme funded by bank premia. The agency assumed bank-resolution authority alongside Bank Indonesia and OJK and provided the credibility anchor allowing the gradual unwinding of crisis-era guarantees without fresh deposit flight.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
increased · weak
greater independence (legal, operational, personnel)
Distinct deposit-insurance authority insulated BI from bank-failure resolution decisions.
financial deregulation
regulatory.financial_deregulation
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
increased · weak
tighter financial regulation
Phased exit from blanket guarantee allowed market-priced risk differentiation across banks.
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · weak
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
Equal-access deposit guarantee reduced advantage of state-owned banks vs. private competitors.
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · weak
larger transfer footprint
Implicit fiscal backstop to depositors institutionalised through capped insurance scheme.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Rapid market liberalisation (price decontrol, mass privatisation, trade opening) under weak institutions produces large short-run welfare losses—rising mortality, falling life expectancy, rising inequality, and collapsing output—that may persist for at least a decade, compared to gradual reformers or non-reformers at similar initial income levels.
free_market_shock_therapy_social_costinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-3.156, |gap|/pre_sd=1.8, p_perm=0.367; claim direction ambiguous
partial
Following the 1989-1992 collapse of the Soviet bloc, post-communist countries that adopted market reforms rapidly (Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania — the "fast reformers") experienced faster recovery in life expectancy at birth than countries that reformed slowly or retained state-socialist economic structures (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan — the "slow reformers").
post_soviet_market_reform_life_expectancyinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.transfer_expansion
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'fast_reformer_post_transition' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Major episodes of financial deregulation — the 1999 US Gramm-Leach- Bliley repeal of Glass-Steagall, the 1986 UK Financial Services Act ("Big Bang"), Chile's 1974-1981 banking liberalisation, Sweden's late-1980s credit-market liberalisation, and Japan's 1996-2001 Big Bang — are followed within 10 years by higher-than-baseline incidence of banking crises, measured by the Laeven-Valencia Systemic Banking Crisis Database, and by elevated credit-to-GDP gaps per BIS.
financial_deregulation_crisis_vulnerabilityinferred
viaregulatory.financial_deregulationregulatory.product_market_competition
SUPPORTED — sign matches claim +, ATT=+0.04145, p=3.34e-07, N=302, treated_countries=8
supported
UK post-1945 Attlee reforms (NHS, nationalisation of coal/rail/steel, expanded public housing) delivered measurable improvements in life expectancy and child mortality without undermining subsequent 1950s-1960s growth.
uk_attlee_reforms_output_health_outcomesinferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionregulatory.financial_deregulationregulatory.product_market_competition
refuted — Only 0 of 3 primaries hold. Failed: life-expectancy, infant-mortality, 1950s growth. UK 1950s growth +1.69%/yr; LE gain +3.29y (peer-mean +4.45y); IMR…
refuted
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_financial_freedom_under5_mortality_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionregulatory.financial_deregulationregulatory.product_market_competition
SUPPORTED — top-vs-bottom gap has expected sign - and Welch p=4.687e-08
supported
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis originated in household-debt-financed consumption sustaining aggregate demand despite stagnant real wages, a Minsky-plus-Marx pattern.
gfc_household_debt_wage_stagnation_linkinferred
viaregulatory.financial_deregulationregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — coef=-0.01111, p=0; claim direction not auto-inferred
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.