De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
Indonesia entered a Stand-By Arrangement and Extended Fund Facility programme with the IMF in October 1997 totalling roughly USD 43 billion in pledged support, conditioned on bank closures, fiscal tightening, monopoly dismantlement (notably clove and plywood boards), trade liberalisation, and central-bank reform. The programme bridged the late Suharto period and the post-1998 Reformasi government, providing the conditionality framework for foundational institutional reforms including BI independence.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.