Policies·ph_coconut_levy_cojuangco_1973_1986

Coconut Industry Investment Fund levy (Philippines 1973-1986)

PHL·1973 – 1986·enacted 1973-08-20·KBL (Marcos)candidate

movessectoral subsidy↑sectoral licensing↓property rights↓

What the policy did

Series of presidential decrees (PD 276 1973, PD 1468 1978) imposed a levy on coconut farmers collected into the Coconut Industry Development Fund, managed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) under Eduardo Cojuangco and the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). Funds used to acquire 14 oil mills (UNICOM) and shares in San Miguel Corporation. PCGG sequestered assets in 1986; Supreme Court ruled coco-levy funds public in trust for farmers (2001, 2012 Cocofed cases).

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · moderate

expanded sectoral subsidies

Compulsory levy functioned as targeted sectoral fund allocated to crony-controlled vehicles.

↓

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

decreased · strong

looser licensing, more open entry

UNICOM oil-mill monopoly consolidation via levy-funded acquisitions.

↓

property rights

institutional.property_rights

Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.

decreased · strong

weaker property rights

Forced extraction from farmers, assets held privately despite public-trust character.

Enacted by

philippines_marcos_crony_capitalism_1976_1986

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.

west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.

zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Nationalisation of producing oil, gas, and mining enterprises without preservation of operational autonomy reduces extractor output within 3–5 years of nationalisation and underperforms the counterfactual trajectory for at least a decade.

resource_extractor_nationalisation_reduces_outputinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+3.268e+10, |gap|/pre_sd=4, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Sectoral nationalisation produces a three-order causal chain.

nationalisation_investment_productivity_decline_venezuelainferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — VEN real GDP -70.9% from 2013 to 2023 vs donor median 15.5% (ARG/CHL/MEX); underperformance 86.4pp

partial

Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.

land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing

PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).

zimbabwe_hyperinflation_land_reform_output_collapse_2000_2009inferred

viainstitutional.property_rights

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Collectivised agriculture in the USSR 1930-1940 raised grain marketings sufficiently to finance industrial investment, delivering Preobrazhensky's scissors-crisis resolution despite high rural transition costs.

soviet_collectivisation_agricultural_marketingsinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — falsification rule not sharpened — auto-grader refuses to grade against the generic stub boilerplate. Promote the spec (replace fals…

run pending

Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.

decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivityinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_inp…

run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

PHILSUCOM / NASUTRA sugar monopoly (Philippines 1976)

PHL·1976

match

2.7

sectoral licensingsectoral subsidyproperty rights

Pakistan 1994 Power Policy — Independent Power Producers framework

PAK·1994

match

2.1

sectoral licensingsectoral subsidyproperty rights

YLB state-led lithium industrialisation (Salar de Uyuni)

BOL·2017