Policies·philippines_coconut_levy_1973

Philippines Coconut Levy 1973

PHL·1965 – 1986candidate

movessectoral licensing↓rule of law↓property rights↓sectoral subsidy↑

What the policy did

Coconut levy introduced under Marcos-era martial-law decrees beginning in 1973, taxing copra producers ostensibly to capitalise the coconut industry through PCA-sponsored institutions including the United Coconut Planters Bank and the consolidated UCPB-Cocofed structure. In practice the proceeds were channelled to Marcos cronies and enterprises, generating decades of recovery litigation and Sandiganbayan/Supreme Court rulings on ill-gotten-wealth status into the 2010s.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

decreased · weak

looser licensing, more open entry

PCA monopoly over copra trading and milling concentrated sectoral control under crony intermediaries.

↓

rule of law

institutional.rule_of_law

Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.

decreased · weak

weaker rule of law

Decree-based diversion of farmer levies to crony entities later ruled an abuse of statutory authority.

↓

property rights

institutional.property_rights

Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.

decreased · weak

weaker property rights

Compulsory levy on coconut farmers without effective beneficiary control eroded rural property claims.

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · weak

expanded sectoral subsidies

Levy proceeds funded UCPB credit and Cocofed-linked sectoral subsidies during the martial-law period.

Enacted by

philippines_marcos_authoritarian_economy_1965_1986

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.

west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).

bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.property_rights

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.

zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_law

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Nationalisation of producing oil, gas, and mining enterprises without preservation of operational autonomy reduces extractor output within 3–5 years of nationalisation and underperforms the counterfactual trajectory for at least a decade.

resource_extractor_nationalisation_reduces_outputinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidyinstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+3.268e+10, |gap|/pre_sd=4, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.

contract_enforcement_fdi_productivity_spilloversinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.sectoral_licensinginstitutional.property_rights

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.1145 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0196

supported

Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.

land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred

viainstitutional.property_rightsinstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.sectoral_licensing

PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.

post_soviet_transition_institutional_variationinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.property_rights

PARTIAL — coef=-3.693e-10, p=0.719 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Coconut Industry Investment Fund levy (Philippines 1973-1986)

PHL·1973

match

1.9

sectoral subsidysectoral licensingproperty rights

PHILSUCOM / NASUTRA sugar monopoly (Philippines 1976)

PHL·1976

match

1.9

sectoral licensingsectoral subsidyproperty rights

ABS-CBN broadcast franchise denial

PHL·2020