General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
IMF Extended Fund Facility of $6bn (later augmented to $6.5bn) over 39 months, approved by the IMF Executive Board on 3 July 2019. Programme triggered ~30% PKR devaluation, policy-rate peak 13.25%, electricity and gas tariff hikes, primary-balance targeting, State Bank of Pakistan operational-independence upgrade (structural benchmark realised via SBP Amendment Act 2022), and revenue-to- GDP target with FBR documentation push. Programme suspended 2020 COVID, resumed, repeatedly renegotiated, concluded June 2023 with a final-tranche combined review. SBP FX reserves, macro disinflation, and current-account adjustment followed programme trajectory with persistent external-financing fragility.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.