IESET.
Policies·ar_corralito_2001

Corralito — Decreto 1570/2001 banking freeze

ARG·2001 – 2002·enacted 2001-12-03·Alianza UCR-FREPASOcandidate
movesproperty rights↓financial deregulation↑

What the policy did

Decreto 1570 of 3 December 2001. Limited bank withdrawals to $250/week per account, prohibited USD transfers abroad above $1,000, and froze time deposits (corralón). Triggered 19-20 December 2001 cacerolazo protests; 27 deaths nationwide; De la Rúa resigned 20 December. Gradually lifted under Duhalde 2002 in tandem with pesificación.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↓
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · strong
weaker property rights
Deposit contracts breached by administrative freeze.
↑
financial deregulation
regulatory.financial_deregulation
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
increased · strong
tighter financial regulation
Capital controls + bank-withdrawal restrictions.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).
zimbabwe_hyperinflation_land_reform_output_collapse_2000_2009inferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.
zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING
run pending
Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, higher expropriation risk — measured by ICRG expropriation risk index, Heritage investment-freedom score, and political-risk ratings — predicts shorter investment horizons (higher share of short-term investment, lower share of structures and machinery) and lower capital intensity in tradable sectors.
expropriation_risk_investment_horizoninferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.financial_deregulation
PARTIAL — coef=-3.637, p=0.231 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.
land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
From a comparable (arguably DPRK-favoured) 1953 armistice starting point — same ethnicity, language, pre-colonial institutional inheritance, and a Japanese colonial industrial capital stock disproportionately located in the North — the Republic of Korea's market economy with state-directed industrial policy and export discipline, versus the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's autarkic central planning under Juche, produced by 2023 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
north_south_korea_development_divergence_1953_presentinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.
decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivityinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_inp…
run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

HETA Asset Resolution bad-bank 2014
AUT·2014
match
1.9
financial deregulationproperty rights
Greece capital controls and bank closure 2015-2019
GRC·2015
match
1.9
financial deregulationproperty rights
Loans-for-shares aftermath and 'seven bankers' 1996-1997
RUS·1996
match
1.9
property rightsfinancial deregulation
Seguro de cambio — BCRA private-debt FX guarantee (Argentina, 1982)
ARG·1982
match
1.7
financial deregulationproperty rights
Greece systemic-bank recapitalisation via HFSF 2013-2014
GRC·2013
match
1.7
financial deregulationproperty rights
Plano Collor I — asset freeze (March 1990)
BRA·1990
match
1.5
financial deregulationproperty rights
Bank nationalisation decree (Mexico, 1 September 1982)
MEX·1982
match
1.5
financial deregulationproperty rights
Bank-nationalisation announcement (Peru, 28 July 1987)
PER·1987
match
1.5
financial deregulationproperty rights

References