IESET.
Policies·bolivia_ypfb_industrialisation

Bolivia Ypfb Industrialisation

BOL·2006 2019candidate
movessectoral licensingsectoral subsidytransfer expansionspending level

What the policy did

Bolivia's YPFB industrialisation policy, launched after the 2006 nationalisation Supreme Decree 28701, refounded Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos as the lead operator across the gas value chain and pursued downstream investments (urea-ammonia complex at Bulo Bulo, LNG and separation plants, lithium pilots through YLB) financed by IDH revenue and Treasury transfers. The intended effect was to capture more rents inside Bolivia, build domestic industrial capacity, and reduce reliance on foreign operators within the MAS extractivist model.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
increased · weak
tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating
Re-monopolisation of upstream and midstream contracts under YPFB tightened sectoral licensing and operator entry.
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · weak
expanded sectoral subsidies
Treasury and IDH transfers were used to capitalise YPFB's downstream and lithium investment programme.
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · weak
larger transfer footprint
Hydrocarbon rents captured by YPFB underwrote the broader transfer expansion (Renta Dignidad, Bono Juancito Pinto).
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · weak
higher spending share
State investment in petrochemicals, gas infrastructure and lithium raised primary public spending and SOE balance-sheet exposure.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.
welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred
viafiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero
partial
Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain.
universal_transfer_programmes_labour_force_participation_declineinferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.spending_level
partial — Prime-age LFP fell by ≥1.0pp in 2/5 cases (threshold for SUPPORTED: ≥3). First-order improved in 3/4 cases. Mixed: consistent with the spec's design-d…
partial
Universal single-payer healthcare systems (NHS, Canadian Medicare) produce lower per-capita healthcare expenditure with equal or better life-expectancy outcomes than the US multi-payer system.
single_payer_cost_outcome_comparisoninferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionregulatory.sectoral_licensing
supported_subset — cost test PASSES (USA per-capita PPP $10957 vs GBR/CAN mean $5663, ratio 1.93x > 1.5); single-payer matched-or-beat USA on 4/5 tested outcome…
supported
Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.
unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred
viafiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansion
SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …
supported
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_under5_mortality_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.spending_level
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=-1.127, p=0.811)
partial
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
heritage_tax_burden_under5_mortality_income_region_robustnessinferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.spending_level
PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=-0.3884, p=0.7236)
partial
Rapid market liberalisation (price decontrol, mass privatisation, trade opening) under weak institutions produces large short-run welfare losses—rising mortality, falling life expectancy, rising inequality, and collapsing output—that may persist for at least a decade, compared to gradual reformers or non-reformers at similar initial income levels.
free_market_shock_therapy_social_costinferred
viafiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-3.156, |gap|/pre_sd=1.8, p_perm=0.367; claim direction ambiguous
partial
Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.
sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred
viaregulatory.sectoral_licensingfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.