De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
The Gesetz über die Deutsche Bundesbank of 26 July 1957 consolidated the Bank deutscher Länder and the Land central banks into a single federal central bank with statutory price-stability mandate and explicit independence from federal government instruction (§12). The law codified the institutional template that later inspired ECB design and entrenched the West German monetary regime that anchored the Wirtschaftswunder.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.