IESET.
Policies·gnb_cashew_export_campaign_2024

Guinea-Bissau cashew export campaign 2024

GNB·2024 – 2024·Embalo presidencycandidate
movessectoral licensing↑trade openness~tax progressivity—

What the policy did

Guinea-Bissau's government opened the 2024 cashew marketing campaign with administered reference prices, export-licensing rules, tax and fee decisions, and official coordination of the dominant export crop. The annual campaign structure shaped farmgate sales, exporter participation, and customs revenue in an economy where raw cashew exports are the main source of rural cash income.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
increased · weak
tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating
Exporters and buyers operate through campaign rules, licensing, and official reference-price conditions.
~
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
mixed · weak
The campaign supports export sales while using administrative controls over pricing and participation.
—
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
unchanged · weak
Campaign fees affect revenue collection but do not materially change personal-tax progressivity.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viaregulatory.trade_openness
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.
canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred
viaregulatory.trade_openness
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Singapore's long-run prosperity and frontier convergence are better predicted by extreme trade openness, strong rule of law, competitive product and services markets, and high economic freedom than by state ownership or industrial targeting alone.
singapore_state_capacity_market_openness_comboinferred
viaregulatory.trade_openness
PARTIAL — coef=-0.0001143, p=0.713 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved higher long-run real per-capita GDP growth over 1960-2019 than otherwise-comparable countries starting at similar income levels in 1960.
industrial_policy_developmentalist_states_growthinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.sectoral_licensing
SUPPORTED — avg ATT across 4 developmentalist cases (KOR/TWN/SGP/CHN) is +1.088 log-points at 40-yr horizon (~+197%). 4/4 cases above the 30 log-point threshold…
supported
Indonesia's 1985-1995 unilateral trade-liberalisation reforms (tariff reductions, customs reform under the Inpres 4 1985 package, removal of import licensing) raised manufacturing exports and trade-openness ratios over the 1985-1996 window before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis interrupted the trajectory.
trade_lib_indonesia_1980s_1990s_unilateralinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.sectoral_licensing
REFUTED — trade openness rose only +1.9pp, below the +5pp refutation gate
refuted
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), with the goods agreement effective 2010-01-01 for the original ASEAN-6, raised ASEAN-6 merchandise-export intensity over the 2010-2019 window relative to non-ASEAN comparator economies.
trade_lib_acfta_asean_china_2010_export_growthinferred
viaregulatory.trade_openness
PARTIAL — ATT=+3.31, p=0.324, N=295, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)
partial
Global value chain (GVC) participation predicts real GDP per capita income upgrading when firms can enter and exit freely, but not when rents are reserved for protected incumbents, in a panel of developing and emerging economies 1990-2020.
global_value_chain_participation_upgradeinferred
viaregulatory.trade_openness
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (22)
run pending
Across countries 1990-2020, accession to a substantive free-trade agreement (FTA) — defined as a WTO-notified preferential-trade agreement going beyond MFN with measurable bilateral tariff reductions — is followed by higher trade openness and higher per-capita real GDP growth in the post-accession 5-year window than in the matched pre-accession 5-year window.
liberal_free_trade_partner_growth_panel_1990_2020inferred
viaregulatory.trade_openness
PARTIAL — ATT=-4.069, p=0.264, N=1342, treated_countries=61 (above α=0.10)
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation (HCI) drive — South Korea 1973-1979
KOR·1973
match
1.0
trade opennesssectoral licensing
Papua New Guinea LNG project agreement 2008
PNG·2008
match
1.0
trade opennesssectoral licensing
Venezuelan Apertura Petrolera 1992-1997
VEN·1992
match
1.0
sectoral licensingtrade openness
Oil nationalisation — Ley 5 de 1975 (Venezuela)
VEN·1975
match
1.0
sectoral licensingtrade openness
EU-Morocco Western Sahara consent and resource-treatment rulings
ESH·2016
match
1.0
trade opennesssectoral licensing
Jokowi nickel ore export ban 2020
IDN·2020
match
0.9
trade opennesssectoral licensing
Kazakhstan Tengiz oil opening 1993
KAZ·1993
match
0.9
trade opennesssectoral licensing
State Foreign Trade Monopoly and Autarkic Controls
MMR·1964
match
0.9
trade opennesssectoral licensing

References

Notes

Public documentation is fragmentary and annual campaign terms can be revised during the season; this captures the 2024 opening framework.