IESET.
Policies·id_ibra_bank_restructuring_1998

Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA/BPPN) programme (1998-2004)

IDN·1998 2004·enacted 1998-01-26·Successive post-Suharto governmentscandidate
movessectoral subsidyfinancial deregulationproperty rights

What the policy did

Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (BPPN) established 26 January 1998 under Keppres 27/1998 to resolve banking-sector crisis. Tasks: take over control of distressed banks, manage recapitalisation process, collect BLBI emergency-liquidity loans from controlling shareholders, dispose of NPL and corporate assets. Took over 54 banks, closed 67 small banks, nationalised 4 large banks (BCA, Danamon, Bank Niaga, Bank Bali), merged 9 banks into Bank Mandiri. Recapitalisation- bond stock placed in banks ~Rp 650tn (~50% of GDP). BCA sold to Farallon Capital-Djarum February 2002 for ~$530m. Agency wound up 27 February 2004.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · strong
expanded sectoral subsidies
~Rp 650tn bank recapitalisation bond stock; fiscal cost of crisis ~50% of GDP.
financial deregulation
regulatory.financial_deregulation
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
decreased · strong
looser financial regulation
Consolidation of supervisory authority, Basel capital enforcement, bank-ownership restrictions.
unintended / side-effect
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · moderate · unintended
weaker property rights
Shareholder wipeouts and forced-merger programmes created near-term expropriation-risk perception.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).
zimbabwe_hyperinflation_land_reform_output_collapse_2000_2009inferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.
zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING
run pending
Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, higher expropriation risk — measured by ICRG expropriation risk index, Heritage investment-freedom score, and political-risk ratings — predicts shorter investment horizons (higher share of short-term investment, lower share of structures and machinery) and lower capital intensity in tradable sectors.
expropriation_risk_investment_horizoninferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.financial_deregulation
PARTIAL — coef=-3.637, p=0.231 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Nationalisation of producing oil, gas, and mining enterprises without preservation of operational autonomy reduces extractor output within 3–5 years of nationalisation and underperforms the counterfactual trajectory for at least a decade.
resource_extractor_nationalisation_reduces_outputinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+3.268e+10, |gap|/pre_sd=4, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Sectoral nationalisation produces a three-order causal chain.
nationalisation_investment_productivity_decline_venezuelainferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — VEN real GDP -70.9% from 2013 to 2023 vs donor median 15.5% (ARG/CHL/MEX); underperformance 86.4pp
partial
Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.
china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growthinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.
land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References