Policies·india_cdot_establishment_1984

Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) establishment (India 1984)

IND·1984 – 1984·enacted 1984-08-25·Indian National Congress (Indira)candidate

movessectoral subsidy↑product market competition↑

What the policy did

Centre for Development of Telematics established 25 Aug 1984 as an autonomous R&D society under the Department of Telecommunications, led by Sam Pitroda (adviser to PM Rajiv Gandhi). Developed indigenous digital switching technology (Rural Automatic Exchange, Main Automatic Exchange) enabling rapid 1986-1995 rural telephony expansion from ~1M lines to ~15M lines.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · weak

expanded sectoral subsidies

Public R&D funding for indigenous telecom equipment.

↑

product market competition

regulatory.product_market_competition

Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.

increased · weak

more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)

Indigenous RAX/MAX technology created domestic equipment manufacturing base.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.

soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).

rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481

refuted

Across a broad panel of developing and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, price controls and directed input subsidies predict higher capital misallocation — measured by the dispersion of the marginal product of capital across firms or sectors — and lower long-run total-factor-productivity growth.

price_signal_distortion_capital_misallocationinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+0.008607, p=0.542 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Market-oriented reform episodes that persist for at least twenty years produce more durable GDP-per-capita and productivity gains than short reform bursts or state-led industrial-policy episodes without sustained market competition.

market_reform_duration_growth_persistenceinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — shape=TWFE, coef=+0.3555, p=0.172 (above α=0.10)

partial

Among high-income economies 2000-2020, startup density (new high- growth firms per 1000 working-age population) predicts frontier prosperity — measured by real GDP per capita growth and productivity growth — more strongly than industrial-policy spending as a share of GDP.

startup_density_frontier_prosperityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=-6.218e-06, p=0.386 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Treuhandanstalt east-German privatisation 1990-1994

DEU·1990

match

1.3

product market competitionsectoral subsidy

Greece Recovery and Resilience Plan 'Greece 2.0' 2021

GRC·2021

match

1.3

sectoral subsidyproduct market competition

Italy PNRR (Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) 2021

ITA·2021