Policies·kr_property_tightening_packages_2017_2021

Moon-era real-estate tightening packages (South Korea, 2017-2021)

KOR·2017 – 2021·enacted 2017-08-02·Democratic Party of Korea (centre-left)candidate

movestax capital↑product market competition↓

What the policy did

Cumulative bundle of 20+ real-estate demand-side tightening measures: (i) designation of Seoul and adjacent districts as "speculative overheated zones" (August 2017) imposing LTV/DTI caps; (ii) multi-home acquisition-tax surcharges (up to 12%); (iii) successive hikes to the Jongbuse comprehensive real-estate holding tax on high-assessed-value and multi-home owners; (iv) capital-gains-tax rate increases and holding-period extensions; (v) the July 2020 Housing Lease Protection Act revision introducing a "2+2" year tenancy and capping renewal rent increases at 5%; (vi) reconstruction-permit and mortgage-product restrictions. Package coincided with ~90% Seoul apartment-price rise 2017-2021.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

tax capital

fiscal.tax_capital

Taxation of capital income (dividends, capital gains, inheritance, wealth). Distinct from corporate rate.

increased · moderate

higher capital income tax

Jongbuse expansion, multi-home acquisition surcharges, capital-gains-tax rate hikes.

↓

product market competition

regulatory.product_market_competition

Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.

decreased · weak

more restrictive regulation, higher entry barriers

LTV/DTI caps and reconstruction limits reduced market-access flexibility in speculative zones.

Enacted by

skorea_moon_dp_2017_2022

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.

soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).

rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481

refuted

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Rapid market liberalisation (price decontrol, mass privatisation, trade opening) under weak institutions produces large short-run welfare losses—rising mortality, falling life expectancy, rising inequality, and collapsing output—that may persist for at least a decade, compared to gradual reformers or non-reformers at similar initial income levels.

free_market_shock_therapy_social_costinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-3.156, |gap|/pre_sd=1.8, p_perm=0.367; claim direction ambiguous

partial

Following the 1989-1992 collapse of the Soviet bloc, post-communist countries that adopted market reforms rapidly (Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania — the "fast reformers") experienced faster recovery in life expectancy at birth than countries that reformed slowly or retained state-socialist economic structures (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan — the "slow reformers").

post_soviet_market_reform_life_expectancyinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'fast_reformer_post_transition' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Market-oriented reform episodes that persist for at least twenty years produce more durable GDP-per-capita and productivity gains than short reform bursts or state-led industrial-policy episodes without sustained market competition.

market_reform_duration_growth_persistenceinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — shape=TWFE, coef=+0.3555, p=0.172 (above α=0.10)

partial

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.

west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competition

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992

AUS·1992

match

1.0

tax capitalproduct market competition

Swedish pension reform (NDC + premium pension, 1998-1999)

SWE·1999

match

1.0

tax capitalproduct market competition

UK Autumn Budget 2024 — tax-raising package

GBR·2024