IESET.
Policies·mx_autonomous_bodies_abolition_2024

Mexican simplificación orgánica — abolition of autonomous regulators (2024)

MEX·2024 – present·enacted 2024-12-20·Morena + PT + PVEM (constitutional supermajority)candidate
movesrule of law↓product market competition↓sectoral licensing↓

What the policy did

Constitutional "simplificacion organica" reform abolishing seven constitutionally autonomous bodies: INAI for transparency and data protection, Cofece for competition, IFT for telecoms and broadcasting, CRE for energy regulation, CNH for hydrocarbons, Coneval for social-policy evaluation, and Mejoredu for education evaluation. Their functions were reassigned to executive-branch ministries or successor administrative units, including economy, energy, anti-corruption, welfare, and education institutions, under the government's administrative-simplification frame.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Independent regulatory agencies replaced by executive-line ministries.
↓
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
decreased · moderate
more restrictive regulation, higher entry barriers
Cofece and IFT autonomy replaced by Economía-internal unit.
↓
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
decreased · moderate
looser licensing, more open entry
Energy regulator (CRE, CNH) autonomy replaced by Sener-internal unit.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.
sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.sectoral_licensing
PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.rule_of_law
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).
bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Across OECD economies 1998-2022, jurisdictions with stricter rule-bound competition-law enforcement (proxied by OECD Product Market Regulation state-control / barriers-to-entry sub-indices and EFW area-5 regulation scores) exhibit higher subsequent multifactor and labour productivity growth than jurisdictions with weaker enforcement, conditional on initial income, openness, and rule-of-law level.
ordo_competition_law_enforcement_growth_premium_oecdinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.sectoral_licensing
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'oecd_pmr_overall' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.
contract_enforcement_fdi_productivity_spilloversinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.sectoral_licensing
SUPPORTED — coef=+0.1145 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0196
supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Czechoslovak normalizace purge and party-economy restructure 1969-1971
CSK·1969
match
1.9
rule of lawproduct market competition
Iran bonyad (religious foundation) system founding 1979
IRN·1979
match
1.9
rule of lawproduct market competition
Forced Urban Evacuation and Rural Labour Reallocation
KHM·1975
match
1.9
product market competitionrule of law
Reunification of Vietnam as SRV (1976)
VNM·1976
match
1.9
rule of lawproduct market competition
ABS-CBN broadcast franchise denial
PHL·2020
match
1.7
sectoral licensingrule of law
Russian loans-for-shares scheme 1995-1996
RUS·1995
match
1.7
rule of lawproduct market competition
OHAL state of emergency and KHK decree-law rule (Turkey 2016-2018)
TUR·2016
match
1.7
rule of lawproduct market competition
Bolivia Gas War (Guerra del Gas) October 2003
BOL·2003
match
1.6
rule of lawproduct market competition

References