IESET.
Policies·ng_marketing_boards_abolition_1986

Nigerian commodity marketing boards abolition (1986)

NGA·1986 – candidate
movesproduct market competition↑sectoral subsidy↓

What the policy did

The Nigerian Cocoa Board, Palm Produce Board, Groundnut Board, Cotton Board, Grains Board, and Rubber Board — state monopsonists that had taxed farmers implicitly via below-market procurement prices since colonial era — were abolished in 1986 under SAP. Farmers could sell freely to private traders and exporters, and real producer prices for cocoa and rubber roughly doubled over 1986-1988.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · strong
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
State commodity monopsonies abolished; private-sector procurement re-established.
↓
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
decreased · moderate
reduced sectoral subsidies
Implicit tax on farmers via board margins removed; budget lost hidden rent.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.
sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Across a broad panel of developing and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, price controls and directed input subsidies predict higher capital misallocation — measured by the dispersion of the marginal product of capital across firms or sectors — and lower long-run total-factor-productivity growth.
price_signal_distortion_capital_misallocationinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — coef=+0.008607, p=0.542 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Market-oriented reform episodes that persist for at least twenty years produce more durable GDP-per-capita and productivity gains than short reform bursts or state-led industrial-policy episodes without sustained market competition.
market_reform_duration_growth_persistenceinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — shape=TWFE, coef=+0.3555, p=0.172 (above α=0.10)
partial
Among high-income economies 2000-2020, startup density (new high- growth firms per 1000 working-age population) predicts frontier prosperity — measured by real GDP per capita growth and productivity growth — more strongly than industrial-policy spending as a share of GDP.
startup_density_frontier_prosperityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — coef=-6.218e-06, p=0.386 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.
export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Milei Shock Therapy — Argentina December 2023 onward
ARG·2023
match
1.9
sectoral subsidyproduct market competition
New Economic Policy — Decree 21060 (Bolivia stabilisation 1985)
BOL·1985
match
1.9
product market competitionsectoral subsidy
Czechoslovak price liberalisation 1991
CSK·1991
match
1.9
product market competitionsectoral subsidy
Rogernomics — New Zealand market reforms 1984-1990
NZL·1984
match
1.9
product market competitionsectoral subsidy
Balcerowicz Plan — Polish shock therapy 1990
POL·1990
match
1.9
product market competitionsectoral subsidy
Balcerowicz Plan — Poland shock therapy 1990
POL·1990
match
1.9
product market competitionsectoral subsidy
Russian Gaidar price liberalisation 1992
RUS·1992
match
1.9
product market competitionsectoral subsidy
Yeltsin-Gaidar shock therapy + voucher privatisation (Russia, 1992-1994)
RUS·1992
match
1.9
sectoral subsidyproduct market competition