Policies·ph_snap_election_edsa_1986

1986 snap election and EDSA People Power Revolution (Philippines)

PHL·1986 – 1986·enacted 1986-02-07·KBL (Marcos) / Transitioncandidate

What the policy did

Snap presidential election held 7 Feb 1986 pitted Marcos against Cory Aquino-Doy Laurel ticket. COMELEC proclaimed Marcos winner; NAMFREL quick-count showed Aquino ahead; 30 COMELEC tabulators walked out citing fraud. Defection of Defense Minister Enrile and AFP Vice Chief Ramos 22 Feb triggered 22-25 Feb EDSA People Power mass civil-disobedience. Marcos airlifted to Hawaii 25 Feb; Corazon Aquino sworn in as President.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

rule of law

institutional.rule_of_law

Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.

increased · strong

stronger rule of law

End of Marcos authoritarianism; political pluralism restored.

↑

judicial independence

institutional.judicial_independence

Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.

increased · moderate

stronger judicial independence

1987 Constitution followed, restoring judicial review.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).

latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)

partial

El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).

bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_law

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

partial

Stronger rule-of-law proxies strengthen quality-of-life and income outcomes under market institutions.

judicial_independence_market_qolinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

PARTIAL — coef=+868, p=0.174 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

partial

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

heritage_judicial_effectiveness_gdp_pc_ppp_current_gapinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

SUPPORTED — top-vs-bottom gap has expected sign + and Welch p=2.72e-13

supported

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

heritage_judicial_effectiveness_investment_share_current_gapinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=1.933, p=0.2924)

partial

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

heritage_judicial_effectiveness_investment_share_income_region_robustnessinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=-0.08458, p=0.9175)

partial

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

heritage_judicial_effectiveness_private_consumption_pc_current_gapinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

SUPPORTED — top-vs-bottom gap has expected sign + and Welch p=3.854e-13

supported

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

heritage_judicial_effectiveness_private_consumption_pc_income_region_robustnessinferred

viainstitutional.rule_of_lawinstitutional.judicial_independence

SUPPORTED — controlled market-score coefficient has expected sign + and p=3.265e-09

supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Juicio a las Juntas (Argentina, 1985)

ARG·1985

match

1.9

rule of lawjudicial independence

Constituição Cidadã 1988 (Brazilian Constitution)

BRA·1988

match

1.9

rule of lawjudicial independence

Constitución Política de Colombia 1991

COL·1991