Policies·cn_ten_year_plan_1978

Hua Guofeng Ten-Year Plan 1976-1985 (China 1978)

CHN·1978 – 1980·enacted 1978-02-26·CCP (Hua Guofeng)candidate

movessectoral subsidy↑trade openness↑product market competition—

What the policy did

Announced by Hua Guofeng at the 1st Session of 5th NPC 26 Feb 1978. Targeted 120 major industrial projects, 10 large oil and gas fields, 8 coal bases, 10 iron-and-steel complexes, and 10% average annual industrial growth 1978-1985, financed via USD65bn plant-import contracts with Japan/Europe. Plan-overstretch exposed balance-of- payments stress by late 1978; 'readjustment' announced at Apr 1979 Central Work Conference cancelled the majority of contracts (Baoshan Steel retained).

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · strong

expanded sectoral subsidies

120 planned heavy-industrial projects; planned investment ratio pushed to unsustainable levels.

↑

trade openness

regulatory.trade_openness

Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.

increased · weak

more open trade

First large Western/Japanese plant-import contracts since 1960s.

—

product market competition

regulatory.product_market_competition

Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.

unchanged · weak

Planned allocation retained; no market-mechanism content.

Enacted by

china_hua_guofeng_transition_1976_1978

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).

rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_openness

REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481

refuted

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.

consumer_choice_variety_trade_market_reforminferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'competition_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.

australia_hawke_keating_reform_long_runinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=-0.03935, p=0.076 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Vietnam's post-Doi Moi economic growth (1986-2020) is more strongly associated with private-sector enterprise entry, trade openness, and market-oriented reforms than with state-owned-enterprise (SOE) expansion or continued state direction.

vietnam_doi_moi_private_sector_growth_shareinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.001558 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0749

supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Spain EEC accession (January 1986)

ESP·1986

match

1.9

trade opennessproduct market competitionsectoral subsidy

Portugal EEC accession 1 January 1986

PRT·1986

match

1.8

trade opennessproduct market competitionsectoral subsidy

Vietnam chip / semiconductor industrial-policy push 2023-present

VNM·2023