IESET.
Policies·cpv_imf_rsf_climate_reforms_2023

Cabo Verde IMF RSF climate reforms 2023

CPV·2023 – present·MpD governmentcandidate
movesenvironmental stringency↑energy supply security↑rule of law↑

What the policy did

Cabo Verde added an IMF Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangement to its macroeconomic programme in 2023 to address climate vulnerability and energy-transition risks. The reform package links concessional financing to climate-risk management, adaptation planning, renewable-energy transition measures, public-investment screening, and resilient infrastructure policy.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
environmental stringency
regulatory.environmental_stringency
Environmental regulation stringency — emissions caps, standards, phase-out mandates, carbon pricing, renewable portfolio standards.
increased · moderate
more stringent environmental rules
RSF reform measures increase climate screening and adaptation requirements in public policy.
↑
energy supply security
regulatory.energy_supply_security
Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.
increased · weak
higher supply-security posture (diversified, strategic reserves)
Energy-transition reforms target more resilient domestic generation and lower exposure to imported fuel shocks.
↑
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
increased · weak
stronger rule of law
Climate-budgeting and investment-screening measures add formal procedures to public investment management.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

German industrial gross value added, manufacturing output, and real household income diverged materially from a synthetic-Germany donor- pool counterfactual over 2018-2025, and a variance decomposition across candidate channels attributes the majority of the divergence to regulatory-channel factors (Environmental Policy Stringency index increase post-2017, nuclear-phase-out schedule, single-supplier Russian gas dependency lock-in, industrial emission and reporting rules) rather than to fiscal-channel factors (general government consumption and tax burden were broadly stable across the Merkel late-term and Scholz years, with the debt brake in effect until 2023).
germany_decline_2018_2025_regulatory_not_fiscalinferred
viaregulatory.energy_supply_securityregulatory.environmental_stringency
partial — DEU below synthetic by -0.251 cumulative over 2018-2022 (sign correct), but magnitude or placebo p=0.36363636363636365 below pre-registered thresholds…
partial
Countries with aggressive green-transition regulatory stringency layered on top of gas-indexed wholesale electricity markets and premature phase-out of firm-dispatchable generation (Germany, UK, Belgium, Netherlands) have experienced materially higher industrial electricity prices 2015-2023 than comparable economies with more measured transition paths (France's nuclear retention, Nordic hydro, USA's shale-gas-backed grid).
green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_pricesinferred
viaregulatory.energy_supply_securityregulatory.environmental_stringency
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'aggressive_green_transition_dummy' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain.
nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exitinferred
viaregulatory.energy_supply_securityregulatory.environmental_stringency
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.04357, |gap|/pre_sd=8.7, p_perm=0.25; claim direction ambiguous
partial
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).
bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
El Salvador's second Bukele term (post-2024 inauguration, with continued régimen-de-excepción and worsening institutional-quality scores) maintains FDI inflows, GDP growth, and tourism arrivals trajectories established in 2019-2024 despite mounting authoritarianism critique (V-Dem electoral-democracy decline, WGI rule-of-law score continuing to fall, Freedom House "partly free" downgrade).
bukele_phase2_post_2024_authoritarian_growth_premiuminferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawregulatory.energy_supply_security
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.3577, |gap|/pre_sd=0.051, p_perm=0.143 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Germany's industrial electricity prices diverged upward from a basket of comparable industrial peers (United States, France, Sweden, Norway, Finland) after the 2011 Energiewende pivot and the gap widened further through the 2014 nuclear-phase-out milestones and the 2022 gas crisis.
german_energiewende_industrial_cost_trajectoryinferred
viaregulatory.energy_supply_securityregulatory.environmental_stringency
refuted — Germany's industrial GVA gap on 2015-2020 average is +0.095 log (wrong sign for industrial-cost-penalty story), placebo p=0.4444444444444444.
refuted
Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).
latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)
partial
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
market_order_rule_of_law_gdp_pc_growth_panelinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=-0.08348, p=0.913 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Belgium nuclear-power programme — Doel and Tihange commissioning (1974-1985)
BEL·1974
match
1.4
energy supply securityenvironmental stringency
France Plan Messmer — nuclear-programme acceleration (1974)
FRA·1974
match
1.4
energy supply securityenvironmental stringency
Clean Power 2030 Action Plan - United Kingdom 2024
GBR·2024
match
1.4
environmental stringencyenergy supply security
Brazil PPCDAm Amazon Deforestation Action Plan 2023
BRA·2023
match
1.3
environmental stringencyrule of law
Italy PNRR (Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) 2021
ITA·2021
match
1.3
rule of lawenvironmental stringency
Swedish Climate Act and climate framework (2017)
SWE·2017
match
1.3
environmental stringencyrule of law
Energiewende — post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out + renewable-energy acceleration
DEU·2011
match
1.2
environmental stringencyenergy supply security
Netherlands Groningen gas field production wind-down 2018-2023
NLD·2018
match
1.2
energy supply securityenvironmental stringencyrule of law

References