Policies·id_ibra_bca_indosat_divestment_2002

Indonesia IBRA BCA and Indosat strategic-asset divestments (2002)

IDN·2002 – 2002·enacted 2002-03-14·PDI-P coalitioncandidate

movesproduct market competition↑trade openness↑sectoral subsidy↓

What the policy did

Two flagship divestments under Megawati's IBRA phase-out plan: (i) Bank Central Asia (BCA) — 51% stake sold to Farallon Capital-Djarum Group consortium 14 March 2002 for ~Rp 5.3tn; (ii) Indosat — 41.9% government stake sold to Singapore Technologies Telemedia (Temasek) 15 December 2002 for Rp 5.6tn (~$627m), politically controversial as sale of national telecom incumbent to Singapore state-linked buyer. KPPU (Fair Business Competition Commission) later ruled 2007 that Temasek held anti-competitive cross-ownership in Indosat and Telkomsel; Temasek divested Indosat stake to Qatar Telecom 2008. Broader IBRA divestment programme including Bank Niaga (to CIMB Malaysia 2002), Bank Danamon (to Asia Financial Temasek 2003), Bank Permata (to Standard Chartered-Astra 2004).

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

product market competition

regulatory.product_market_competition

Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.

increased · moderate

more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)

Foreign-acquisition of major banks and telecom incumbent increased cross-border competition.

↑

trade openness

regulatory.trade_openness

Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.

increased · moderate

more open trade

Foreign strategic-acquisition of BCA, Indosat, Bank Niaga et al.

↓

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

decreased · weak

reduced sectoral subsidies

Divestment proceeds applied to bond-stock reduction, lowered ongoing SOE-subsidy footprint.

Enacted by

indonesia_megawati_pdip_2001_2004

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).

rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_openness

REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481

refuted

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.

consumer_choice_variety_trade_market_reforminferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'competition_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.

australia_hawke_keating_reform_long_runinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=-0.03935, p=0.076 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Vietnam's post-Doi Moi economic growth (1986-2020) is more strongly associated with private-sector enterprise entry, trade openness, and market-oriented reforms than with state-owned-enterprise (SOE) expansion or continued state direction.

vietnam_doi_moi_private_sector_growth_shareinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.001558 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0749

supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

New Economic Policy — Decree 21060 (Bolivia stabilisation 1985)

BOL·1985

match

2.4

trade opennessproduct market competitionsectoral subsidy

Czechoslovak price liberalisation 1991

CSK·1991

match

2.4

product market competitiontrade opennesssectoral subsidy

Rogernomics — New Zealand market reforms 1984-1990

NZL·1984