IESET.
Policies·jordan_investment_environment_law_2022

Jordan Investment Environment Law No. 21 of 2022

JOR·2023 – present·Hashemite monarchy; Bisher Khasawneh governmentcandidate
movesproduct market competition↑property rights↑trade openness↑

What the policy did

Jordan enacted Investment Environment Law No. 21 of 2022 to consolidate and update the investor regime supporting the Economic Modernisation Vision. The law reorganised investment services, incentives, and investor guarantees around a more unified investment environment, aiming to reduce administrative friction and improve foreign and domestic investor treatment.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · moderate
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
A unified investor regime and streamlined services reduce entry and expansion barriers for firms.
↑
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
increased · moderate
stronger property rights
Investor guarantees and clearer treatment rules strengthen security of investment-backed property and contractual rights.
↑
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · weak
more open trade
The law is designed to attract foreign investment and export-oriented activity under the Invest Jordan agenda.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_opennessinstitutional.property_rights
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_openness
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.
australia_hawke_keating_reform_long_runinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitioninstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — coef=-0.03935, p=0.076 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
NZ Rogernomics 1984–1993 liberalisation (tariff removal, SOE corporatisation, financial-market liberalisation) produced productivity acceleration and real-income gains over 1990s–2000s relative to pre-reform trend.
nz_rogernomics_productivity_effectinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessinstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.product_market_competition
refuted — NZ synthetic-control log-TFP gap mean over 1995-2005 = -3.80% (<= 0); informative log GDP-pc gap = -22.70%. Productivity acceleration claim not suppor…
refuted
Singapore's long-run prosperity and frontier convergence are better predicted by extreme trade openness, strong rule of law, competitive product and services markets, and high economic freedom than by state ownership or industrial targeting alone.
singapore_state_capacity_market_openness_comboinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessinstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — coef=-0.0001143, p=0.713 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Chile’s long-run income convergence is stronger after the combination of market reforms (1975–1990) and democratic institutional repair (1990 onward) than under the earlier state-led import-substitution regime (1950–1973).
chile_market_reform_long_horizon_with_democracyinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessinstitutional.property_rightsregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+5132, |gap|/pre_sd=15, p_perm=0.417 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Balcerowicz Plan — Poland shock therapy 1990
POL·1990
match
2.4
product market competitiontrade opennessproperty rights
Đổi Mới (Renovation) — Vietnam 1986
VNM·1986
match
2.4
product market competitiontrade opennessproperty rights
Reform and Opening (改革开放) — 1978
CHN·1978
match
2.3
product market competitiontrade opennessproperty rights
Open door to French capital and expertise
CIV·1960
match
1.9
trade opennessproperty rightsproduct market competition
Czechoslovak large privatisation — voucher first wave 1991-1992
CSK·1991
match
1.7
property rightsproduct market competition
Treuhandanstalt east-German privatisation 1990-1994
DEU·1990
match
1.7
product market competitionproperty rights
Hungarian accelerated privatisation (APV Rt) 1995-1997
HUN·1995
match
1.7
product market competitionproperty rights
Vietnam Khoán 10 household contract system in agriculture 1988
VNM·1988
match
1.7
property rightsproduct market competition

References