General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
Cabinet decision of 16 December 2022 adopting the revised National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy, and the Defence Build-up Plan (the "three security documents"). Commits Japan to raising defence-related spending to 2% of GDP by fiscal year 2027 — roughly doubling from the historical ~1% ceiling — within a five-year envelope of approximately ¥43tn. Introduces counterstrike (hangeki) capability, Tomahawk purchases, standoff missile programmes, munitions- stockpile build-up, and cyber / space domain investment. Partly funded through a package of tobacco, corporate, and income surtaxes (with a special reconstruction-surtax reallocation) plus non-tax revenue measures, though the full revenue stream was not locked in at adoption. Marks the most substantial revision of Japanese defence posture since the 1976 1%-of-GDP self-imposed ceiling.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.