Policies·pk_cpec_launch_2015

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — Phase 1 launch (2015)

PAK·2015 – 2020·enacted 2015-04-20·PML-N (initial); continuation under PTIcandidate

movessectoral subsidy↑energy supply security↑trade openness↑

What the policy did

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor framework signed during Xi Jinping's Islamabad visit on 20 April 2015, initial envelope $46bn later expanded to ~$62bn. Phase 1 front-loaded on energy generation (Sahiwal coal 1,320MW, Port Qasim coal 1,320MW, Karot hydro, Thar coal mine-mouth projects, LNG regasification terminals), road infrastructure (Karakoram Highway Phase II, Multan-Sukkur motorway M-5), and Gwadar port / free-zone development. IPP tariffs guaranteed via sovereign take-or-pay capacity-payment contracts; financing mix of Chinese policy-bank concessional debt and Chinese-equity IPPs with sovereign guarantees. Resolved the 12-18h/day load-shedding that had constrained Pakistani industrial output for a decade; subsequently generated capacity-overhang and circular-debt issues from 2019 onward.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · strong

expanded sectoral subsidies

IPP capacity payments under sovereign guarantees; concessional-rate debt sub-sovereign.

↑

energy supply security

regulatory.energy_supply_security

Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.

increased · strong

higher supply-security posture (diversified, strategic reserves)

~10GW added 2015-2018 resolving load-shedding.

↑

trade openness

regulatory.trade_openness

Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.

increased · weak

more open trade

Corridor-trade with PRC; CPFTA Phase 2 follow-on.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Across a broad panel of countries 1960-2019, higher trade openness predicts faster long-run convergence of real GDP per capita toward the global frontier (the United States) than industrial-policy intensity does.

trade_openness_long_run_income_convergenceinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.energy_supply_security

PARTIAL — coef=+6.729e-18, p=0.00881; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Lula third-term's Nova Indústria Brasil 2024 industrial-policy package, conditioned on export performance and technology-diffusion metrics, produces measurable sectoral capability gains (semiconductors, green hydrogen, health-industrial complex) by 2030 — replicating the East Asian export-discipline conditionality pattern rather than the earlier Latin American import-substitution-industrialisation pattern.

nova_industria_brasil_export_discipline_pattern_effectinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.energy_supply_security

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.trade_openness

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Germany's industrial electricity prices diverged upward from a basket of comparable industrial peers (United States, France, Sweden, Norway, Finland) after the 2011 Energiewende pivot and the gap widened further through the 2014 nuclear-phase-out milestones and the 2022 gas crisis.

german_energiewende_industrial_cost_trajectoryinferred

viaregulatory.energy_supply_securityfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.trade_openness

refuted — Germany's industrial GVA gap on 2015-2020 average is +0.095 log (wrong sign for industrial-cost-penalty story), placebo p=0.4444444444444444.

refuted

Major trade-liberalisation events — defined as sharp, policy-driven increases in trade-to-GDP openness sustained over at least 5 years — are associated with positive subsequent per-capita GDP growth over 10-year horizons, relative to matched non-liberalising controls.

trade_liberalisation_growth_effectinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.energy_supply_security

PARTIAL — ATT=+6.139e-12, p=0.285, N=584, treated_countries=29 (above α=0.10)

partial

Hong Kong's long-run income convergence to the productivity frontier without classic industrial policy (sectoral targeting, directed credit, national champions, or SOE promotion) matches or exceeds that of developmentalist East Asian comparators after controlling for initial income, human capital, and trade openness.

hong_kong_no_industrial_policy_frontier_comparisoninferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

REFUTED — coef=-0.06133 (sign opposite claim +), p=7.33e-15

refuted

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Proálcool sugar-ethanol fuel programme (Brazil, 1975)

BRA·1975

match

2.0

sectoral subsidyenergy supply security

France Plan Messmer — nuclear-programme acceleration (1974)

FRA·1974

match

2.0

energy supply securitysectoral subsidy

Qatar North Field LNG expansion

QAT·2021