Policies·br_nuclear_accord_germany_1975

Brazil-West Germany nuclear cooperation accord (27 June 1975)

BRA·1975 – 1991·enacted 1975-06-27candidate

movessectoral licensing↑sectoral subsidy↑energy supply security↑

What the policy did

Bilateral agreement with West Germany for eight nuclear reactors plus enrichment, reprocessing, and fuel-cycle technology transfer. Signed in Bonn 27 June 1975 via Nuclen joint venture with Kraftwerk Union. Produced Angra II (completed 2001) and Angra III (construction halted and resumed multiple times). US State Department opposed under non-proliferation concerns.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

increased · moderate

tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · moderate

expanded sectoral subsidies

↑

energy supply security

regulatory.energy_supply_security

Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.

increased · moderate

higher supply-security posture (diversified, strategic reserves)

Enacted by

brazil_geisel_abertura_1974_1979

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Germany's industrial electricity prices diverged upward from a basket of comparable industrial peers (United States, France, Sweden, Norway, Finland) after the 2011 Energiewende pivot and the gap widened further through the 2014 nuclear-phase-out milestones and the 2022 gas crisis.

german_energiewende_industrial_cost_trajectoryinferred

viaregulatory.energy_supply_securityfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

refuted — Germany's industrial GVA gap on 2015-2020 average is +0.095 log (wrong sign for industrial-cost-penalty story), placebo p=0.4444444444444444.

refuted

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred

viaregulatory.sectoral_licensingfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

German industrial gross value added, manufacturing output, and real household income diverged materially from a synthetic-Germany donor- pool counterfactual over 2018-2025, and a variance decomposition across candidate channels attributes the majority of the divergence to regulatory-channel factors (Environmental Policy Stringency index increase post-2017, nuclear-phase-out schedule, single-supplier Russian gas dependency lock-in, industrial emission and reporting rules) rather than to fiscal-channel factors (general government consumption and tax burden were broadly stable across the Merkel late-term and Scholz years, with the debt brake in effect until 2023).

germany_decline_2018_2025_regulatory_not_fiscalinferred

viaregulatory.energy_supply_security

partial — DEU below synthetic by -0.251 cumulative over 2018-2022 (sign correct), but magnitude or placebo p=0.36363636363636365 below pre-registered thresholds…

partial

Across a broad panel of countries 1960-2019, higher trade openness predicts faster long-run convergence of real GDP per capita toward the global frontier (the United States) than industrial-policy intensity does.

trade_openness_long_run_income_convergenceinferred

viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.energy_supply_security

PARTIAL — coef=+6.729e-18, p=0.00881; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Lula third-term's Nova Indústria Brasil 2024 industrial-policy package, conditioned on export performance and technology-diffusion metrics, produces measurable sectoral capability gains (semiconductors, green hydrogen, health-industrial complex) by 2030 — replicating the East Asian export-discipline conditionality pattern rather than the earlier Latin American import-substitution-industrialisation pattern.

nova_industria_brasil_export_discipline_pattern_effectinferred

viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.energy_supply_security

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain.

nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exitinferred

viaregulatory.energy_supply_security

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.04357, |gap|/pre_sd=8.7, p_perm=0.25; claim direction ambiguous

partial

Biden's IRA/CHIPS industrial policy will show partial success on capacity-building metrics and mixed results on job creation, consistent with the conditional view that industrial policy works where targeting is technically competent and governance is strong.

industrial_policy_semiconductor_chips_act_effectivenessinferred

viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.sectoral_licensing

inconclusive — Stacked: (4/4) spec-named semi-specific series unavailable on disk (oecd:STAN_INDUSTRY ISIC C26, bls:CES3133, ilostat:semiconductor employment, c…

run pending

Countries with aggressive green-transition regulatory stringency layered on top of gas-indexed wholesale electricity markets and premature phase-out of firm-dispatchable generation (Germany, UK, Belgium, Netherlands) have experienced materially higher industrial electricity prices 2015-2023 than comparable economies with more measured transition paths (France's nuclear retention, Nordic hydro, USA's shale-gas-backed grid).

green_transition_cost_trajectory_electricity_pricesinferred

viaregulatory.energy_supply_security

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'aggressive_green_transition_dummy' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Proálcool sugar-ethanol fuel programme (Brazil, 1975)

BRA·1975

match

2.4

sectoral subsidyenergy supply securitysectoral licensing

Energiewende — post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out + renewable-energy acceleration

DEU·2011

match

2.1

sectoral licensingsectoral subsidyenergy supply security

Swedish nuclear new-build framework and credit guarantees (2023-2024)

SWE·2023