Policies·cn_anti_corruption_campaign_2012

Anti Corruption Campaign 2012

CHN·2012 – presentcandidate

movesproduct market competition↓sectoral licensing↓sectoral subsidy↑trade openness↓

What the policy did

Sweeping anti-corruption campaign launched in late 2012 under Xi Jinping, run by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and from 2018 the National Supervisory Commission. Targeted both 'tigers' (senior officials) and 'flies' (low-level cadres), investigating millions of officials and consolidating Xi's political authority while disciplining factions across party, military, and SOE hierarchies.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

product market competition

regulatory.product_market_competition

Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.

decreased · weak

more restrictive regulation, higher entry barriers

Concentrated political risk discouraged risk-taking and entrenched politically connected SOE incumbents.

↓

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

decreased · weak

looser licensing, more open entry

CCDI investigations chilled discretionary licensing decisions, slowing approvals in many sectors.

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · weak

expanded sectoral subsidies

Movement-aligned industrial-policy spending grew as the campaign reasserted central control.

↓

trade openness

regulatory.trade_openness

Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.

decreased · weak

more protectionist

Tighter discipline on cross-border activity and FX channels reduced effective trade-finance openness.

Enacted by

china_xi_era_2012_present

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

sectoral_competition_services_productivityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.sectoral_licensingregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+0.000842, p=0.361 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).

rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred

viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_openness

REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481

refuted

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.

consumer_choice_variety_trade_market_reforminferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'competition_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Export promotion combined with domestic competition policy outperforms export promotion combined with domestic protection (entry barriers, state aid to incumbents, preferential procurement) in raising real export growth and manufacturing TFP, in a broad-country panel 1990-2020.

export_promotion_without_protectioninferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (22)

run pending

Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.

australia_hawke_keating_reform_long_runinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition

PARTIAL — coef=-0.03935, p=0.076 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive

partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025)

CHN·2015

match

1.8

sectoral subsidysectoral licensingtrade openness

Industrialising industries strategy

DZA·1967

match

1.8

sectoral subsidytrade opennessproduct market competition

Proton Saga national car launch (Malaysia 1985)

MYS, JPN·1985