tax corporate

Australian superannuation guarantee 1992 produced broad-based retirement-savings expansion without the crowd-out or private-saving collapse predicted by some critics.

Money creation dominated by bank credit flows predicts asset-price inflation; money creation dominated by fiscal transfer flows predicts goods inflation.

Large real effective exchange-rate appreciations mean-revert.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker productivity growth through favoritism and subsidy allocation.

In an OECD-country panel 2014-2024, reductions in the top statutory capital- gains tax rate predict higher subsequent gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP and higher business-startup rates, controlling for corporate-tax rates, interest rates, and institutional quality.

China's local-government-financing-vehicle (LGFV) debt expansion 2015-2024 — driven by post-2015 credit easing, infrastructure stimulus to offset property weakness, and 2020-2022 COVID fiscal response — produced a structural rise in non-financial-corporate debt-to-GDP and a generalised public-sector debt-to-GDP increase that is observable in BIS credit aggregates and IMF general-government debt series.

Lower statutory corporate tax rates predict higher business investment and faster capital deepening, with larger effects in open economies.

Across OECD countries 1990-2023, the rise in the old-age dependency ratio is associated with a proportional increase in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP and crowding-out of productive public investment, particularly where pay-as-you-go pension architecture predominates.

Sweden absorbed approximately 163,000 asylum applicants in 2015 (~1.6% of population in one year).

The 1965 US Hart-Celler immigration reform replaced national-origin quotas with a family-reunification + skill-based system, producing a multi-decade shift in the composition and scale of US migrant inflows.

Higher discretionary state-allocation burden proxies predict lower control-of-corruption scores.

Post-2008 eurozone austerity disproportionately affected households in the bottom income quintile; distributional cost was not necessary for fiscal consolidation, given alternative tax-side options.

Higher fiscal-transparency indices predict lower sovereign bond-yield spreads and smaller default-risk premia at given debt levels.

Lower broad subsidy and state-consumption burden proxies predict stronger electricity-access and quality-of-life gains.

German sectoral co-determination (Mitbestimmung) and workers-on-boards has coexisted with competitive export-manufacturing performance 1976-present, refuting the claim that worker voice necessarily reduces firm competitiveness.

Across 26 Swiss cantons 1990-2023, cantons with persistently lower effective corporate tax rates, looser regulatory burden, and higher Fraser-style sub-national economic-freedom ranks exhibit higher per-capita GDP growth, higher private business formation rates, and higher net inward migration of high-earning workers than cantons with persistently tighter regulation and higher tax rates.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.

The net fiscal contribution of immigrants (taxes paid minus public services + transfers received, measured in lifetime NPV terms) varies systematically by (a) origin-country institutional quality, (b) skill level at arrival, (c) age at arrival, (d) duration of residence, and (e) legal status (working-age visa / family reunification / asylum).

India's November 2016 demonetisation (sudden withdrawal of 86% of currency in circulation by value, INR500 and INR1000 notes) produced a measurable short-run output contraction visible in quarterly real GDP growth and a persistent negative effect on the cash-intensive informal-sector through 2017-2018, with no offsetting medium-run benefit on tax-revenue / GDP or formalisation indicators by 2019.

Higher inflation volatility predicts shorter corporate investment horizons and higher hurdle rates.

Higher discretionary intervention burden proxies predict weaker long-run prosperity growth over broad windows.

Rising state-intervention burden proxies predict lower long-run quality-of-life and income growth.

Persistent broad subsidy and government-consumption burdens predict weaker long-run household consumption growth.

Ireland’s long-run convergence from a middle-income to a high-income economy during 1987–2024 is better predicted by trade openness, tax competitiveness, and FDI entry than by classic industrial planning.

Argentina's 2017 Macri-government labour-reform package (Vaca Muerta sector-specific reform, broader labour-cost reduction proposal partially blocked) failed to deliver a measurable formal-employment gain by 2019: synthetic-DiD gap on formal-employment share is statistically indistinguishable from zero against a Latin-American donor pool, falsifying the strong-pro-employment claim.

Brazil's November 2017 Reforma Trabalhista (Law 13,467/2017: intermittent-contract creation, collective-bargaining prevalence over statute, judicial-fee imposition on labour claims) raised the Brazilian formal-employment rate by at least 1 pp by 2019 relative to a synthetic control of Latin- American peers, but did not reduce informal-sector share.

Hungary's 2018 "slave law" overtime amendment (Act CXVI/2018: raising annual overtime cap from 250 to 400 hours, allowing 3-year reference periods) effective 2019-Q1 raised the Hungarian average annual hours worked by at least 1.5% relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad peers, but did not produce a measurable expansion in employment-rate or output growth.

Japan's 2004 Worker Dispatch Law amendment (manufacturing- sector liberalisation effective 2004-Q1, period extension to 3 years) raised the Japanese non-regular-worker share by at least 4 pp by 2008 relative to a synthetic control of high-income peers, but did not raise aggregate employment rate above donor pool baseline.

South Korea's 1998 IMF-program labour reforms (lifetime- employment relaxation, dispatch-worker law, layoff-rule liberalisation) restructured the Korean labour market: by 2003 non-regular-worker share rose by at least 8 pp relative to a synthetic control of East-Asian peers, and aggregate employment-rate recovered to pre-crisis level, but the regular-worker share fell durably.

Mexico's 2019 labour reform (recognition of authentic collective-bargaining, pre-USMCA labour-side-letter compliance) and the 2021 outsourcing prohibition increased the formal-employment share by at least 2 pp by 2023 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with the largest gains concentrated in manufacturing-export states.

Poland's 2017 retirement-age reversal (PiS-government rollback of the 2012 Tusk-government age increase: women's age 60 from 67, men's age 65 from 67) reduced the 55-64 employment-rate by at least 3 pp by 2020 relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad-Central-European peers, and increased the early pension take-up rate substantially.

Sweden's 1990s labour-market reforms (1991 unemployment-insurance partial reform, 1994 Lindbeck-Commission-driven activation changes, 1995 EU accession liberalisation) accelerated post- crisis employment-rate recovery between 1995 and 2002 by at least 2 pp relative to a synthetic control of Nordic and northern-European peers, conditional on the 1992 currency-peg collapse and SEK depreciation channel.

Vietnam's 2019 Labour Code revision (Law 45/2019/QH14: retirement-age increase, multiple-trade-union recognition, working-time provisions, dispute-resolution reform) effective 2021-Q1 raised the Vietnamese formal-employment share by at least 1.5 pp by 2024 relative to a synthetic control of ASEAN peers, with the largest gains in foreign- invested manufacturing.

Across Latin American economies 1999-2024, countries that adopted numerical fiscal rules (Chile 2001, Brazil LRF 1999, Colombia 2011, Mexico Pemex-and-budget 2006, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006) showed measurably better fiscal-balance dispersion and lower public-debt growth than non-adopters, conditional on commodity-cycle exposure.

Macron 2017-2019 labour-tax reforms produced measurable employment gains but had distributional costs; welfare-state-adjustment outcome is mixed and depends on transfer-side offsets.

Higher share of mandatory vs discretionary spending predicts stronger automatic stabilisers and less pro-cyclical fiscal policy.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, stronger fiscal balances predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger government-consumption shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher domestic savings shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher manufacturing value-added shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger public-debt shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict lower employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict lower investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict shallower private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict higher employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Swedish Meidner plan / wage-earner funds 1984-1991 did not produce measurable capital flight during their brief implementation, falsifying claims that citizen ownership funds trigger disinvestment.

Direct central-bank financing of fiscal deficits predicts higher inflation within 2–3 years, especially when institutional independence is weak.

US New Deal 1933-1938 (public-works employment, Social Security, Wagner Act) raised median living standards and reduced unemployment faster than the pre-1933 laissez-faire counterfactual, vindicating democratic reformist economic management.

Excessive occupational-licensing scope (US state-level variation) reduces inter-state labour mobility and sector productivity relative to light-licensing alternatives.

Paraguay 2003-2024 quietly delivered cumulative log real-GDP per capita growth in the top half of Latin America, with low inflation (mean below 5% annualised), stable fiscal balance, and durable currency, despite minimal headline reform attention.

Fed QE programmes 2008–2014 lowered long-end yields and corporate spreads, raising asset prices and stimulating investment through portfolio-rebalancing and signalling channels even at the zero lower bound.

Reagan's 1981–1986 marginal-tax-rate reductions produced measurable labour-supply response at the top of the distribution, with output growth exceeding the pre-reform trend.

Binding rent control initiates a three-order causal chain.

The Spanish police-recorded sexual-offence rate per 100,000 population cannot be interpreted directly across the 7 October 2022 entry into force of Ley Orgánica 10/2022 ("Ley de garantía integral de la libertad sexual", colloquially "solo sí es sí"), because that statute redefined the boundaries of the sexual-offence category: it replaced the prior distinction between "abuso sexual" (without violence/intimidation) and "agresión sexual" (with violence/intimidation) with a single consent-based "agresión sexual" offence category, broadened what conduct is prosecutable, and reorganised statistical reporting categories used by INE and the Sistema Estadístico de Criminalidad of the Ministerio del Interior.

Higher broad state-consumption burden proxies predict worse child-mortality nutrition-risk outcomes.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict lower long-run living-standard levels.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker high-technology diffusion than competitive financing.

Higher broad state-consumption burden proxies predict weaker productivity and income levels.

Higher state-consumption burden proxies predict weaker electricity-access outcomes over long windows.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker infrastructure access outcomes than competitive procurement.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker voice-and-accountability and information-quality proxies.

Transition from pay-as-you-go to funded pensions predicts higher national savings and capital deepening, but transition costs matter for fiscal sustainability.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker voice-and-accountability information-quality outcomes.

Automatic indexation of tax brackets to inflation prevents real tax burden increases and supports labour-supply growth.

International tax competition for mobile capital predicts lower corporate rates but does not reduce total corporate revenue when bases are broad.

More tax exemptions and special regimes predict higher compliance costs, larger avoidance sectors, and lower effective progressivity.

Chilean post-Pinochet tax progressivity reforms — Concertación-era Aylwin-Frei marginal-rate increases 1990-1995, Bachelet 2014 reform raising corporate rate from 20 to 27 percent + DTA tightening, Boric 2022-2024 reform attempts — produced gradual reductions in the Chilean top-1 pretax income share by at least 1.5 percentage points over 1990-2024 vs Latin-American synthetic comparator pool, with most of the level shift concentrated in 1990-2000 rather than the recent reform attempts.

Estonia's 1994 flat-tax 26 percent (subsequently reduced to 20 percent by 2015) and the unique 2000 corporate-tax reform (taxing only distributed corporate profits) produced a measurable rise in the Estonian top-1 pretax income share over 1994-2010 vs Baltic synthetic comparator (LVA, LTU), with the distributed-profit-only corporate regime channelling capital-income into top-decile reported income while reducing taxation of retained earnings.

The 2000 Schroder corporate + personal tax reform package (top personal rate cut from 53 to 42 percent staged 2000-2005, corporate rate cut from 40 to 25 percent, capital-gains exemption on inter-corporate shareholdings) is associated with a 1.0 to 1.5 percentage point rise in the German top-1 pre-tax income share over 2000-2008 vs Eurozone synthetic control, but no measurable rise in aggregate output growth beyond Eurozone trend.

South Korea's Moon-era progressive turn 2017-2020 (top marginal rate raised from 40 to 42 then 45 percent, corporate top rate raised from 22 to 25 percent, capital-gains broadening) produced a measurable decline in the Korean top-1 pretax income share by at least 0.5 percentage points over 2017-2022 vs East-Asia synthetic control, consistent with the public-finance literature where rate increases in evasion-constrained but enforcement-intensifying environments produce real distributional effects.

Trump's 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act produced smaller investment and output responses than Laffer-curve advocates projected, consistent with New Keynesian estimates of corporate-tax-cut passthrough in a near-full-employment economy with inelastic long-run investment supply.

The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), effective 2012-03-15, raised bilateral US-Korea merchandise trade volumes and Korean manufacturing-export share to GDP relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of comparable East Asian and OECD economies over the 2012-2019 pre-COVID window.

Erdogan's "unorthodox" doctrine 2021-2023 — repeated TCMB rate cuts during accelerating inflation under his Islamist-finance theory that high rates cause inflation — produced a textbook monetary-policy failure: lira collapse, inflation-expectations de-anchoring, and CPI peaking above 85% YoY before the post-election 2023 reversal under Erkan/Karahan brought rates from 8.5% to 50% and slowly re-anchored expectations.

Following Bhaduri-Marglin (1990) and the Stockhammer-Onaran post-Keynesian empirical tradition, advanced economies are heterogeneously classified as "wage-led" or "profit-led" depending on whether a rise in the wage share raises or lowers aggregate demand.

Wealth taxes produce a three-order causal chain.

Finland's 2017-2018 Basic Income Experiment (2000 randomised unemployed-benefit recipients receiving EUR 560/month unconditional cash for 24 months versus matched-control unemployed-benefit recipients) produced a small positive employment effect — ATT of less than 6 days additional employment in year 2 — and a measurable improvement in self-reported wellbeing and trust-in-government, providing the cleanest RCT evidence available for unconditional-basic-income labour-supply effects in a high-welfare- state institutional context.

India's combined rural transfer architecture — MGNREGA (2006 employment guarantee, 100 days at state-minimum-wage) and PM-KISAN (2019 unconditional cash transfer of INR 6000/year to small farmers) — produced complementary rural-poverty effects, with MGNREGA delivering wage-floor and consumption- smoothing channels and PM-KISAN delivering targeted-input-finance channel, identified off staggered rollout cohorts and combined-treatment intensity in the panel of Indian states 2006-2024.

The Stockton SEED guaranteed-income trial (Feb 2019 - Jan 2021, 125 randomised treated recipients receiving USD 500/month for 24 months in low-income Stockton CA neighbourhoods) produced a measurable full-time-employment-rate increase of approximately 12 percentage points in the treated group versus control, as reported in the West-Castro 2021 evaluation, providing US-context RCT evidence that unconditional-cash floors can complement rather than substitute for labour-market participation among working-age low-income recipients.