sectoral licensing

Kenya's 2007 launch of M-Pesa and subsequent build-out of mobile-money rails (2007-2024) produced a measurable acceleration in financial inclusion, household consumption smoothing, and informal-to-formal transition relative to Sub-Saharan African peers without comparable mobile-money penetration.

South Africa's persistent electricity-supply crisis (Eskom load-shedding episodes 2007, 2014-2015, 2018-2024) caused a measurable and cumulative manufacturing-sector contraction and total-factor-productivity drag, with effects intensifying in the post-2018 phase as load-shedding hours per year escalated to record levels.

Sub-Saharan African economies' post-2020 COVID recovery trajectories diverged systematically along three dimensions: oil/commodity exporters (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon) underperformed on inflation; fiscally-constrained economies in debt distress (Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya) underperformed on growth; and tourism-dependent or fiscally- cushioned economies (Mauritius, Botswana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire) recovered faster.

US business-dynamism measures — the firm-formation rate (new establishments per 1000 working-age population), the job- reallocation rate, and the share of employment in firms aged 0-5 — declined materially over 1980-2020.

In a cross-country panel of OECD and middle-income democracies 1960-2019, the age of stable democratic institutions (years since last constitutional rupture) is positively associated with the density of distributional coalitions (proxied by union density, professional-licensing prevalence, and OECD PMR entry-barrier scores) and negatively associated with TFP growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita and human-capital level.

Deeper private-credit market proxies predict stronger productivity growth than state-owned banking allocation.

The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis was a systemic banking-and-credit rupture in the advanced-economy core (USA, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, the Eurozone periphery) with the canonical multi-metric pattern of large credit-to-GDP run-up followed by sharp output contraction, persistent unemployment, large fiscal-deficit blowout, and long real-house-price retracement.

The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis affected a tightly-clustered group of east-Asian economies (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines) through a common pattern of currency-peg collapse, foreign-currency-denominated bank-and-corporate balance-sheet distress, large IMF programmes, and sharp output contractions.

China's 2015 stock-market crash and the 2020-2024 property-sector deleveraging episode (Evergrande default August 2021, Country Garden distress August 2023, the "three red lines" macroprudential framework introduced 2020) constitute a sustained financial-stress episode characterised by extreme equity volatility 2015-2016, real residential property price decline >= 10% in tier-2/3 cities 2021-2024, and developer-bond defaults exceeding RMB 1 trillion cumulative.

The March 2013 Cyprus banking crisis, in which uninsured depositors at Bank of Cyprus and Laiki Bank were converted to equity / written down ("bail-in"), produced a real GDP peak-to-trough decline of >= 8%, a bank-credit-to-GDP decline of >= 100 pp, an unemployment-rate rise of >= 10 pp, and required an EUR 10bn ESM programme.

The 2008 Icelandic banking collapse (failure of Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing in October 2008) is a canonical case of a small-open-economy systemic banking crisis driven by external-funded balance-sheet expansion exceeding any plausible lender-of- last-resort capacity.

The 2008-2013 Irish banking crisis was a property-credit-bust event in which the Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks, and Bank of Ireland balance-sheet expansion during 2003-2007 produced a real-house-price peak-to-trough decline of >= 50%, a bank-rescue fiscal cost of >= 25% of GDP, an unemployment rate rise of >= 9 pp, and a Troika programme entry.

Italy's 2016-2017 banking-distress episode — Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena precautionary recapitalisation in July 2017, Veneto-banks resolution in June 2017, and a peak system-wide non-performing-loan ratio above 17% — represents a protracted-NPL-overhang post-GFC banking distress case that did NOT meet the canonical full-systemic-banking-crisis threshold but DID require multiple state-aid resolution events.

Latvia's 2008-2010 banking crisis — Parex Banka nationalisation in November 2008, EUR-peg defence, EUR 7.5bn IMF / EU programme, real-GDP cumulative decline of >= 20% peak-to-trough, and unemployment-rate rise of >= 13 pp — is a canonical small-open-economy hard-peg-defence + banking-rescue case from the GFC era.

Lebanon's 2019-2024 banking collapse — informal capital controls, multi-tier exchange rates, sovereign default on Eurobonds in March 2020, and a real-GDP cumulative decline of >= 35% — constitutes a canonical case of a peg-plus-Ponzi- banking-system unwind in a small, dollarised, post-civil-war economy.

The 1988-1993 Nordic banking crises (Norway 1988-1991, Sweden 1991-1992, Finland 1991-1993) are a canonical post-deregulation credit-boom-bust panel.

The August 1998 Russian crisis — domestic-currency sovereign default, ruble devaluation of >= 60% against USD, real-GDP contraction of >= 5%, banking-system collapse with widespread bank failures, and IMF programme entry — is the canonical EM sovereign-and-banking-twin-default case of the late 1990s.

In the Schularick-Taylor cross-country macrohistory panel restricted to the post-1980 era, sustained acceleration of bank credit to the private non-financial sector relative to GDP raises the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis within a five-year forward window.

South Africa's August 2014 African Bank Limited curatorship — SARB-led resolution of an unsecured-consumer-credit lender, retail-deposit guarantee, good-bank / bad-bank split, no propagation to systemic banks (Standard Bank, FirstRand, Absa, Nedbank) — is a canonical case of a contained-resolution single-institution failure in an emerging market with an effective supervisory framework.

Spain's 2012 banking-sector restructuring of the cajas (regional savings banks), including the FROB recapitalisation, the creation of SAREB (the bad-bank vehicle), and the EUR 100bn ESM bank-recapitalisation programme, occurred in response to a multi-year buildup of property-credit exposure that produced a peak-to-trough real house-price decline of >= 35%, an unemployment rate rise to >= 25%, and a government-debt run-up of >= 50 pp of GDP.

Vietnam's 2012-2015 banking-sector restructuring — Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) created July 2013, NPL ratio peak above 4%, mandatory mergers of weak banks, and forced central-bank acquisition of three commercial banks at zero VND in 2015 — represents a controlled-resolution emerging-market banking distress event without a full systemic crisis.

Bismarckian contributory welfare architectures (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) are more fiscally sustainable than tax-financed universal architectures when demographic ageing is severe, because contribution-benefit linkage constrains expansion.

Skilled emigration rates (tertiary-educated migrants as a share of the tertiary-educated domestic population) are higher from countries with weaker market opportunity (lower EFW business freedom, higher entry barriers, weaker property rights) than from peers at similar income levels with stronger market institutions, even when public investment in education and research is high.

Strict building-height restrictions near transit nodes predict lower agglomeration productivity and higher office or housing costs.

Among high-income frontier economies 1980-2020, countries with higher business dynamism — measured by firm-entry rates, job- reallocation rates, and low incumbent-employment share — maintain stronger real income growth per capita than countries with low churn and high incumbent protection.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker productivity growth through favoritism and subsidy allocation.

Across Caribbean small-island economies 1990-2024, climate-related shocks (named hurricanes, tropical-storm landfalls, sea-level encroachment events) imposed measurable cumulative real-GDP-per- capita losses correlated with storm frequency and intensity, and insurance-market and disaster-financing arrangements (CCRIF SPC, contingent-credit lines) reduced — but did not eliminate — the growth penalty.

US-style Certificate-of-Need restrictions predict slower capacity growth and weaker health-access improvement than non-CON regimes.

China's property-sector deleveraging shock 2020-2024 — triggered by the August 2020 "three red lines" policy on developer leverage, escalating through Evergrande's September 2021 default, Country Garden's 2023 liquidity crisis, and the persistent ghost-cities inventory overhang — produced a structural break in residential investment and a sustained drag on aggregate growth that is identifiable in real GDP, gross capital formation, and the household-consumption share of GDP.

China's 2010-2023 state-directed solar-PV and onshore-wind manufacturing scale-up (Renewable Energy Law 2005, 12th and 13th Five-Year Plan industrial-policy targets) is the dominant source of the ~85% global decline in solar-PV module costs and the ~55% decline in onshore-wind LCOE over the same window.

China's state-directed solar and wind manufacturing scale-up 2005-2020 delivered cost reductions on learning curves faster than any market-led OECD programme, demonstrating planning-led industrial policy's ecological potential.

Across US states 2000-2022, higher occupational-licensing intensity in licensed service sectors (proxied by share of state workforce requiring a state-issued license, derived from BLS Current Population Survey supplements) is associated with higher consumer prices in the affected service sectors and lower employment in those sectors, conditional on state per-capita income, demographic composition, and rural/urban share.

Sectoral collective-bargaining extension to non-signatory firms predicts higher unemployment in small firms and reduced entry.

Strict competition-policy enforcement (EU DG-Comp, Bundeskartellamt) produces higher consumer welfare than laissez-faire antitrust (US post-Bork consumer-welfare-standard narrowing) in sectors prone to concentration.

Higher market openness and regulatory quality predict broader telecom and internet diffusion.

Longer construction-permit approval times predict higher construction costs and lower housing-output elasticity.

Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.

Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.

Costa Rica's 1950-2023 development trajectory reaches US-comparable life expectancy at birth (within 1.5 years of US LE in 2010-2020) at roughly one-fifth the per-capita CO2 emissions and a UNDP HDI score within 0.05 of the US level by 2020.

Abolition of state cotton marketing boards predicts higher output and yield growth relative to state monopsony regimes.

Cuban post-1991 Special Period forced degrowth (real GDP per capita contracted ~35% over 1989-1993 after the Soviet bloc collapse cut off concessional sugar/oil terms) demonstrated that basic-needs provision (life expectancy, infant mortality, primary-school enrolment) can be maintained — or improved — during rapid material-throughput reduction when institutions are aligned around free universal health and education.

Removal of dairy production quotas predicts output expansion and price normalisation without persistent farm-income collapse.

Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.

Kidney-dialysis markets with competing providers and outcome-based reimbursement show lower mortality and hospitalisation than single-provider models.

Higher regulatory quality predicts faster internet diffusion for digital education access.

Higher discretionary state-allocation burden proxies predict lower control-of-corruption scores.

Consumer subsidies and charging-network markets predict more durable EV adoption than production quotas or manufacturer mandates after subsidy withdrawal.

Stronger regulatory quality in energy markets predicts better household energy access and affordability proxies.

Removal of fossil-fuel and electricity subsidies predicts more efficient energy use and faster renewable adoption than continued subsidy.

Pre-2010 Ethiopian developmental-state strategy (state-led infrastructure, industrial parks, export-credit allocation) produced the fastest sustained African growth rates, consistent with late-developer industrial-policy theory.

The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — reporting phase from October 2023, certificate-purchase phase from 2026 — raises the effective landed cost of EU-manufactured CBAM-covered products (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, electricity) in extra-EU markets because (a) EU producers face the full EU ETS carbon price without free-allocation offsets during the phase-out and (b) EU exports to non-CBAM jurisdictions face cost disadvantages from embedded-carbon-cost pass-through.

The EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals regulation (REACH, entered into force 2007 with phased registration deadlines 2010, 2013, 2018) imposed substantial fixed-cost registration requirements on chemical substances manufactured or imported above threshold tonnages.

The cumulative EU regulatory stack (GDPR 2018, MiFID II 2018, DMA 2022, DSA 2022, AI Act 2024, Taxonomy Regulation 2020, CSRD 2023, MiCA 2023, CBAM 2023, plus sector-specific accretion) has imposed measurable productivity drag on EU firms relative to US counterparts in the same sectors.

Agricultural export liberalisation predicts faster diversification into higher-value crops than import-substitution agricultural policy.

Export promotion combined with domestic competition policy outperforms export promotion combined with domestic protection (entry barriers, state aid to incumbents, preferential procurement) in raising real export growth and manufacturing TFP, in a broad-country panel 1990-2020.

Hard ceilings on farm size predict lower agricultural labour productivity after 20 years than market-determined scale.

Financial liberalisation (capital-account opening, domestic interest-rate deregulation, removal of credit controls) without prudential regulation (strong supervision, capital adequacy, macro-prudential buffers) raises the probability and severity of banking and currency crises, which can erase long-run market-reform gains in GDP per capita.

The ECB's June-2014 introduction of a negative deposit-facility rate (initially -0.10%, cut to -0.50% by September-2019) and the parallel Swiss / Danish / Swedish / Japanese negative-rate experiments lowered short-end money-market rates and core sovereign-bond yields below zero, but did NOT cause an aggregate decline in eurozone bank deposits or measurable deposit-flight from the banking sector.

Across an unbalanced panel of OECD and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, higher firm-entry rates (new business registrations per 1000 working-age population) predict stronger subsequent 20-year total-factor-productivity growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita, human capital, and capital-deepening rates.

Fossil-fuel subsidies across OECD 1980-2020 persisted despite declared climate commitments, consistent with the eco-socialist claim that private fossil-reserve ownership structurally blocks adequate public action.

Across middle-income and catch-up economies 1980-2020, high state-directed allocation — measured by state-enterprise share of output, directed-credit intensity, and public-investment-driven growth — is associated with larger boom-bust cycles after middle-income status is reached, even when early catch-up growth is strong.

Fuel-subsidy removal with targeted cash transfers predicts more efficient energy use and better redistribution than universal subsidy.

The cumulative EU digital-sector regulatory stack — GDPR (2018), Digital Markets Act (2022), Digital Services Act (2022), AI Act (2024) — has imposed a measurable fixed-compliance-cost burden that falls disproportionately on scale of EU-headquartered digital firms relative to US counterparts.

The 2007-2009 global financial crisis produced deeper and more persistent output contractions in liberalised financial systems (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland) than in more state-managed financial systems (China, Vietnam), controlling for pre-crisis openness, exchange-rate regime, and fiscal space.

The 2007-2009 financial crisis originated in endogenous leverage build-up (Minsky hedge→speculative→Ponzi financing transition) within financial sector balance sheets, not in exogenous shocks.

Countries permitting GM crop cultivation without prolonged moratoria experienced faster agricultural yield convergence than ban or delay countries.

Across advanced economies over 1985-2020, countries with forced-saving / architecture-based redistribution (Singapore CPF, Chilean AFP pre-2008, Australian Superannuation, Swiss mixed pension pillars) achieve comparable or superior long-run growth outcomes alongside comparable distributional improvements in household net wealth distribution relative to countries relying primarily on tax-and-transfer redistribution (Nordic cluster, UK, France).

In post-1992 China, sectors and provinces with persistently high state-owned-enterprise (SOE) shares of fixed-asset investment exhibit lower TFP growth and higher incremental capital-output ratios (ICOR — capital used per unit of additional output) than sectors and provinces dominated by private firms, after controlling for sector composition, urbanisation, and human capital.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Post-Keynesian / Minsky reading: across advanced economies in the decade preceding the 2008 GFC, the rise in household credit-to-GDP was the leading indicator of subsequent banking-sector distress.

China's agricultural output growth accelerated after the household responsibility system replaced collective farming, relative to comparable middle-income reform peers.

Tenant-based vouchers predict better long-run neighbourhood and earnings outcomes than project-based public housing in high-poverty tracts.

Every documented hyperinflation episode since 1900 (Weimar Germany, post-WW2 Hungary, Yugoslavia 1990s, Zimbabwe 2000s, Venezuela 2010s-2020s, among others) was preceded by fiscal dominance — a state of affairs where monetary policy is subordinated to financing government deficits that cannot be financed by taxation or market-rate borrowing.

Countries liberalising medical-imaging equipment licensing and private-clinic entry show larger reductions in diagnostic wait times.

Per-capita crime rates (measured by police-recorded offences per 100k population, by offence type) among foreign-born residents in developed destination countries are NOT systematically higher than among native-born residents once age, gender, and socioeconomic status are controlled.

Higher broad state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker high-technology innovation diffusion.

India's 1991 balance-of-payments-crisis-driven liberalisation programme (Manmohan Singh's package: rupee devaluation, industrial delicensing, trade liberalisation, FDI opening, partial financial- sector reform) produced a sustained acceleration in per-capita GDP growth.

Indigenous-managed territories (documented across Amazon basin, Canadian First Nations, Australian Indigenous Protected Areas) retain higher biodiversity and lower deforestation than state-protected or privately-held land of matched biome.

Indigenous-managed parcels in the Amazon basin (BRA, PER, COL, ECU, BOL), Canadian First-Nations comanagement areas, and Australian Indigenous Protected Areas retain at least 20% more above-ground biomass per hectare than biome-matched state- protected and private parcels over 2003-2023, after controlling for slope, accessibility, and pre-treatment biome composition.

Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.

Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved higher long-run real per-capita GDP growth over 1960-2019 than otherwise-comparable countries starting at similar income levels in 1960.

Biden's IRA/CHIPS industrial policy will show partial success on capacity-building metrics and mixed results on job creation, consistent with the conditional view that industrial policy works where targeting is technically competent and governance is strong.

State-led infrastructure investment (transport, energy, water, telecommunications) has high economic returns in countries below basic access thresholds (paved-road density <20 km per 100 km2, electricity access <80%, clean water access <90%), confirming developmentalist catch-up logic.

Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger innovation-cluster proxies through firm entry and labor mobility.

Cross-country variation in intergenerational income mobility (commonly measured as the rank-rank slope or intergenerational income elasticity) across OECD countries is substantially explained by institutional determinants — education-system equality of provision, residential segregation, and housing affordability — rather than by the aggregate redistribution level.

Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) era (1960-1985) produced positive catch-up productivity growth through technology licensing coordination and scale economies, but Japan's post-1990 stagnation is associated with protected domestic sectors, zombie lending to inefficient incumbents, and weak product-market competition.

The observed decline in the labour share of gross value added across OECD economies over 1980-2020 (typically 4-8 percentage points) is explained by a decomposable set of channels rather than a single cause: (a) capital-intensity technological change with capital and labour complementarity below unity (Karabarbounis-Neiman), (b) globalisation and import competition lowering tradable-sector wage bargaining power (Elsby-Hobijn-Sahin), (c) rising market concentration enabling markup expansion (De Loecker-Eeckhout-Unger), and (d) measurement artefacts from owner-occupier imputed-rent accounting and self-employment income allocation (Rognlie, Gollin).

Argentina's 2017 Macri-government labour-reform package (Vaca Muerta sector-specific reform, broader labour-cost reduction proposal partially blocked) failed to deliver a measurable formal-employment gain by 2019: synthetic-DiD gap on formal-employment share is statistically indistinguishable from zero against a Latin-American donor pool, falsifying the strong-pro-employment claim.

Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.

Land-value or split-rate property taxation predicts lower vacancy and faster redevelopment than pure improvement taxation.

Liberal democracies experience monotonic positional drift toward larger, more redistributive states across multi-decade horizons.

Across US states and a cross-country panel of OECD and middle- income economies 1980-2020, higher occupational and business licensing burdens predict weaker entrepreneurship rates and lower intergenerational income mobility over long horizons.

Higher regulatory quality predicts higher control-of-corruption scores, consistent with lower licensing discretion and bribery.

In high-income countries 1990-2020, gains in life satisfaction (subjective well-being) are more strongly associated with real income growth, employment opportunity, and institutional trust than with the intensity of state economic planning or public-sector employment share.

Malaysia's post-1990 growth plateau is associated with protected national-champion industrial policy (Proton, GLC preference, sectoral reservation) and ethnic-allocation constraints (Bumiputera equity requirements, preferential procurement) that reduced product-market competition and resource allocation efficiency after successful early catch-up (1970-1990).

Higher regulatory quality and competition proxies predict stronger high-technology export and innovation-quality proxies.

Deregulation of entry permits and licensing predicts higher firm-entry rates and lower informal-sector share.

Unified national building, sanitary, and product standards predict faster cross-regional firm entry and higher productivity than fragmented subnational regulation.

Countries with more market-responsive hospital and physician supply show larger declines in amenable mortality over 20-year panels.

Market opening predicts faster diffusion of consumer durable and communications technologies.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict higher employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger voice-and-accountability proxies in democracies and open institutions.

Material-footprint caps (Switzerland's 1-tonne society target, Welsh Wellbeing of Future Generations Act 2015) are technically implementable without triggering the collapse predicted by critics.

Large mortgage-interest deductions do not raise long-run homeownership rates but do raise house-price-to-income ratios.

Sectors dominated by national-champion firms show lower 20-year total-factor- productivity growth than comparable competitive sectors after the initial scale-up phase, in a broad panel of OECD and emerging-market economies during 1980-2020.

The 2022-2026 window saw rhetorical and policy-stated revival of Western large-scale nuclear power: France committed to EPR2 fleet (6 + 8 reactors by 2050) under loi accélération du nucléaire 2023; UK confirmed Sizewell C investment FID 2024 + Small Modular Reactor (SMR) competitive selection 2024-2025; US Vogtle Unit 4 commercial start July 2024 + several SMR / advanced-reactor licensing applications; Japan re-pivoted to nuclear restart + lifetime extension (2023 GX framework permits >60-year operation); Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium reversed phase-out policies.

Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger income mobility proxies than discretionary licensing-heavy systems.

Excessive occupational-licensing scope (US state-level variation) reduces inter-state labour mobility and sector productivity relative to light-licensing alternatives.

Occupational licensing predicts higher wages in licensed occupations but lower interstate mobility and slower wage convergence.

In OECD and accession-country panels 1998-2019, reductions in the OECD PMR overall product-market-regulation index predict higher subsequent TFP growth.

Private competition in cataract and refractive surgery markets predicts long-run real-price decline and technology adoption.

Post-war West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder (1948-1965) reflects the combined effect of (a) Erhard's June-1948 currency reform plus immediate price-control liberalisation and (b) the 1957 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) anti-cartel law.

Across OECD economies 1998-2022, jurisdictions with stricter rule-bound competition-law enforcement (proxied by OECD Product Market Regulation state-control / barriers-to-entry sub-indices and EFW area-5 regulation scores) exhibit higher subsequent multifactor and labour productivity growth than jurisdictions with weaker enforcement, conditional on initial income, openness, and rule-of-law level.

Abolishing parking minimums near transit predicts lower per-unit construction costs and faster multifamily permitting.

State-capped medical-school or residency places predict slower physician-supply growth and weaker mortality improvement in ageing populations.

Technology markets with sustained multi-platform competition show faster quality-adjusted improvement than markets protected by interoperability barriers.

Market-compatible regulatory quality predicts higher labor-force participation where benefits can remain portable.

Countries maintaining long-lived food price controls or state procurement show slower agricultural value-added growth than market-priced peers.

Statutory price ceilings set below market-clearing prices reliably produce shortages, rationing via queue or privilege, quality degradation, and black-market arbitrage — across every documented episode where enforcement is sustained.

Binding statutory price controls produce a three-order causal chain.

Lower price-distortion intensity predicts stronger long-run goods availability and living-standard gains.

Stronger market price signals and lower sector-entry barriers predict faster labour reallocation during terms-of-trade shocks.

Following Schularick-Taylor 2012 and Jorda-Schularick-Taylor, the five-year change in private credit-to-GDP is a leading indicator of subsequent financial-sector distress in the OECD post-1980 panel.

Private and market-compatible generation entry proxies predict faster electrification.

Private-sector and service-market expansion proxies predict higher household consumption levels.

Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger investment and innovation diffusion where procurement is more rule-bound.

Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger high-technology diffusion consistent with entry-permitting regulatory sandboxes.

Resource-funded developmentalist states produce early public-investment gains but weaker long-run economic diversification and lower TFP growth than market-open resource peers over 30-year windows in a broad panel of resource-rich economies during 1970-2020.

UK Town and Country Planning Act 1947 and subsequent restrictive-zoning regimes produce measurable housing supply elasticity reductions and price level increases relative to more-permissive planning systems.

Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.

Services trade liberalisation predicts stronger total factor productivity growth in high-income frontier economies after 1990 than goods-sector industrial policy does.

Singapore's Changi airport, SIA, port-state, and open-city strategy produced a durable air-services and visitor hub: by the pre-COVID endpoint, tourist arrivals were multiple times resident population, receipts were material, and the same economy remained extremely trade-open.

The LKY-era Singapore model was extraordinarily trade-open rather than autarkic: trade and exports were far above GDP, trade openness beat regional peers, and manufactured exports became a dominant share by 1990.

Universal single-payer healthcare systems (NHS, Canadian Medicare) produce lower per-capita healthcare expenditure with equal or better life-expectancy outcomes than the US multi-payer system.

Smallholder-dominant systems converge to higher long-run agricultural productivity than plantation-dominant systems after controlling for crop mix and land quality.

Right-to-buy and social-housing privatisation transfers predict higher household wealth accumulation than continued state ownership.

The Spanish police-recorded sexual-offence rate per 100,000 population cannot be interpreted directly across the 7 October 2022 entry into force of Ley Orgánica 10/2022 ("Ley de garantía integral de la libertad sexual", colloquially "solo sí es sí"), because that statute redefined the boundaries of the sexual-offence category: it replaced the prior distinction between "abuso sexual" (without violence/intimidation) and "agresión sexual" (with violence/intimidation) with a single consent-based "agresión sexual" offence category, broadened what conduct is prosecutable, and reorganised statistical reporting categories used by INE and the Sistema Estadístico de Criminalidad of the Ministerio del Interior.

Countries moving from administrative spectrum allocation to market auctions show faster mobile and internet diffusion.

Among high-income economies 2000-2020, startup density (new high- growth firms per 1000 working-age population) predicts frontier prosperity — measured by real GDP per capita growth and productivity growth — more strongly than industrial-policy spending as a share of GDP.

Higher state-bank credit share predicts lower loan quality and weaker long-run TFP growth than private-bank-dominated systems.

Infrastructure quality improves most where state capacity enables market-compatible regulation.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker high-technology diffusion than competitive financing.

Persistent state-directed credit allocation predicts higher zombie-firm shares and lower total-factor-productivity growth over 15-30 year windows in a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies.

State commodity-marketing boards capture lower farm-gate prices and show more rent-seeking than private auction markets.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker infrastructure access outcomes than competitive procurement.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker voice-and-accountability information-quality outcomes.

Lower price-signal and regulatory-quality proxies predict higher inflationary shortage pressure.

Deeper private financial-market proxies predict stronger productivity growth than state-directed allocation alone.

More tax exemptions and special regimes predict higher compliance costs, larger avoidance sectors, and lower effective progressivity.

The growth of the top-1% pre-tax national income share across OECD economies over 1980-2020 is primarily driven by two channels that are consistent with marginal-product returns in skill-biased and capital- deep economies — (a) specialist-wage growth concentrated in superstar- firm and specialist-services sectors, and (b) capital-income growth driven by asset-price appreciation relative to wage income — with material but smaller contributions from (c) rent-extraction indicators (finance-sector share, executive-compensation-to-worker-pay ratio) and (d) sector concentration effects.

Argentina's manufacturing sector did not benefit durably from Mercosur (1991 onward) — manufacturing share of GDP fell over 1995-2019 from approximately 18% to 14%, a trajectory broadly consistent with non-Mercosur Latin American comparators (suggesting global deindustrialisation, not Mercosur-induced gain).

Chile's bilateral-FTA cascade (Canada 1997, Mexico 1999, EU 2003, Korea 2004, US 2004, China 2006, Japan 2007) is associated with Chile's trade-openness-to-GDP rising from approximately 50% in 1990 to over 70% by 2019 — among the largest sustained increases in Latin America.

Indonesia's 1985-1995 unilateral trade-liberalisation reforms (tariff reductions, customs reform under the Inpres 4 1985 package, removal of import licensing) raised manufacturing exports and trade-openness ratios over the 1985-1996 window before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis interrupted the trajectory.

Japan's CPTPP entry (2018-12-30) plus the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (effective 2019-02-01) jointly produced a modest measurable trade-openness expansion for Japan over the 2019-2024 window relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of large advanced economies.

NAFTA (effective 1994-01-01) raised Mexican manufacturing value-added and merchandise-export intensity over the 1994-2007 pre-China-shock window relative to a synthetic-control pool of Latin American non-NAFTA economies.

The UK's exit from the EU single market (effective 2021-01-01 end of transition) reduced UK trade-openness and merchandise exports relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of European comparator economies.

Major trade-liberalisation events — defined as sharp, policy-driven increases in trade-to-GDP openness sustained over at least 5 years — are associated with positive subsequent per-capita GDP growth over 10-year horizons, relative to matched non-liberalising controls.

Mandatory training levies with firm-specific training predict stronger productivity effects than levies funding general state training.

Higher regulatory quality predicts better transport-access proxies and commute-related quality of life.

Universal healthcare systems across OECD produce lower per-capita health spending than the US multi-payer system at equal or better outcome measures.

Higher regulatory quality predicts better urban-service availability proxies over long windows.

The US-EU GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) gap has widened materially between 2000 and 2023.

Deeper private financial-market proxies predict stronger high-technology and innovation diffusion outcomes.

Forced-saving welfare architectures (Singapore CPF since 1955, Chile AFP since 1981, Australia Superannuation Guarantee since 1992) and universal-transfer architectures (Nordic model, UK NHS) produce different profiles on two dimensions: (a) retirement-income adequacy for the median retiree, and (b) long-run fiscal sustainability as measured by projected net liabilities of the pension / welfare state over 30+ year horizons.

New Zealand's 1991 'Mother of All Budgets' benefit cuts (8-25% reductions to unemployment, sickness, domestic-purposes, and youth benefits, with stricter eligibility) produced a step-change rise in child poverty (under-65%-median) of at least 6 percentage points within 5 years, identified off the synthetic-control gap with Australia and other small Anglo economies, providing empirical weight to the democratic-socialist critique of front-loaded welfare retrenchment in commodity-exposed economies.

Sweden's 1990s welfare-state consolidation (replacement-rate cuts to sickness/unemployment insurance 1991-1996, 1998 pension reform to NDC, child-allowance flatten 1996-2006) preserved poverty/inequality outcomes (Gini and bottom-40 income share) within plus-or-minus 5% of pre-crisis levels while restoring fiscal sustainability (debt/GDP back below 50% by 2008), supporting the scale-preserving consolidation interpretation rather than retreat from the universal-transfer model.

The UK Universal Credit rollout (2013-2017, replacing six legacy means-tested benefits with a single taper) raised employment-rate among legacy-benefit claimants by 3 to 5 percentage points within 24 months of area rollout, identified off geographic-staggered Pathfinder/full-service rollout timing 2013-2018, controlling for area unemployment and the post-Brexit-vote labour-market shock.

Across OECD economies 2020-2024, sector-level work-from-home adoption is uncorrelated or weakly positively correlated with sector-level labour-productivity growth — i.e.