property rights

Kenya's 2007 launch of M-Pesa and subsequent build-out of mobile-money rails (2007-2024) produced a measurable acceleration in financial inclusion, household consumption smoothing, and informal-to-formal transition relative to Sub-Saharan African peers without comparable mobile-money penetration.

Mauritius's 1970-launched Export Processing Zone, sequenced upper-middle-income transition through textiles → tourism → financial services, and post-2000 services-export diversification produced a sustained convergence pattern that distinguishes it from SSA peers.

Rwanda's post-1995 reconstruction trajectory under the RPF/Kagame government produced a multi-decade growth premium versus Sub-Saharan African peers, accompanied by sharp improvements in life expectancy, child mortality, and electrification, and a comparatively idiosyncratic civil-liberties regression captured in V-Dem and Freedom House.

Countries that impose agricultural export bans during price spikes show larger domestic price volatility and lower long-run farm investment.

Argentina's post-1945 economic decline from high-income status is attributable to institutional instability (Peronist-military cycles, property-rights uncertainty, central-bank subordination) more than to specific policy choices.

Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.

In a long-run cross-country panel 1960-2019, economies with persistently high gross domestic savings rates (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) generate more TFP growth per unit of investment than economies whose investment is predominantly financed by foreign credit inflows or domestic credit expansion.

Deeper private-credit market proxies predict stronger productivity growth than state-owned banking allocation.

Latvia's 2008-2010 banking crisis — Parex Banka nationalisation in November 2008, EUR-peg defence, EUR 7.5bn IMF / EU programme, real-GDP cumulative decline of >= 20% peak-to-trough, and unemployment-rate rise of >= 13 pp — is a canonical small-open-economy hard-peg-defence + banking-rescue case from the GFC era.

The 1988-1993 Nordic banking crises (Norway 1988-1991, Sweden 1991-1992, Finland 1991-1993) are a canonical post-deregulation credit-boom-bust panel.

The March 2023 US regional-banking distress — Silicon Valley Bank failure 10-Mar-2023, Signature Bank failure 12-Mar-2023, First Republic Bank failure 1-May-2023, plus the Bank Term Funding Program created 12-Mar-2023 — was a duration-mismatch / uninsured-deposit-flight event triggered by the 2022-2023 Fed-tightening cycle marking long-duration AFS securities below-water.

The US Savings & Loan crisis of 1986-1995 — closure or assistance of >= 1,000 thrifts, Resolution Trust Corporation creation in 1989, FDIC bank failures peaking in 1988-1992, estimated taxpayer cost in the USD 100-200bn range, and a Laeven-Valencia coded systemic banking crisis 1988 — was a US-domestic banking crisis with limited GDP impact.

Bilateral investment treaties predict higher FDI inflows, especially in countries with weaker domestic rule of law.

In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, the cumulative stock of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed predicts higher subsequent net FDI inflows as a share of GDP and higher real GDP per capita growth, controlling for institutional quality, market size, and trade openness.

Bolivia's 2006-2019 Morales-MAS era (May 2006 hydrocarbons nationalisation, renegotiated gas-export contracts with Brazil and Argentina, expansion of cash-transfer programmes Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad, fixed-currency-peg-style stabilisation, large social investment) produced a measurable poverty-reduction and growth record relative to a Latin American resource-dependent peer pool.

Botswana's divergence from Sub-Saharan African averages post-1966 is attributable primarily to retained pre-colonial Tswana chieftaincy institutions plus post-independence resource-rent management, rather than resource endowment alone.

Skilled emigration rates (tertiary-educated migrants as a share of the tertiary-educated domestic population) are higher from countries with weaker market opportunity (lower EFW business freedom, higher entry barriers, weaker property rights) than from peers at similar income levels with stronger market institutions, even when public investment in education and research is high.

El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).

El Salvador's ~98% homicide-rate decline from 103/100k (2015) to 2.4/100k (2023) — with the sharpest decline occurring after the Mar 2022 régimen de excepción and the Jan 2023 CECOT opening — is causally attributable in material part to the Bukele-era mass-incarceration regime (régimen de excepción + Plan Control Territorial + CECOT).

El Salvador's second Bukele term (post-2024 inauguration, with continued régimen-de-excepción and worsening institutional-quality scores) maintains FDI inflows, GDP growth, and tourism arrivals trajectories established in 2019-2024 despite mounting authoritarianism critique (V-Dem electoral-democracy decline, WGI rule-of-law score continuing to fall, Freedom House "partly free" downgrade).

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

Capital-account liberalisation predicts faster growth only above rule-of-law and regulatory-quality thresholds; below them it raises crisis frequency.

Capital account openness supports long-run real GDP per capita growth only above institutional-quality thresholds; below them it raises the frequency and severity of financial crises without delivering offsetting growth gains, in a broad-country panel 1970-2020.

Developmentalist catch-up growth premiums are strongest before countries reach roughly 40 percent of US GDP per capita, but the premium fades or reverses after that middle-income threshold unless market competition and rule-bound institutions strengthen.

In Maddison long-run country panels, catch-up growth is materially faster below roughly 40 percent of US GDP per capita than above that threshold, but the post-threshold premium is small enough that the developmentalist catch-up advantage fades over longer 10-year windows.

Pinochet-era Chile's monetary stabilisation (post-1975, advised by Chicago Boys) produced lower inflation and higher growth than contemporaneous Latin American countries using heterodox stabilisation.

Chile’s long-run income convergence is stronger after the combination of market reforms (1975–1990) and democratic institutional repair (1990 onward) than under the earlier state-led import-substitution regime (1950–1973).

Chile and Venezuela began the 1999-2023 window at broadly comparable GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars).

China's 1978 Deng-era reforms — Household Responsibility System in agriculture, Special Economic Zones, dual-track price liberalisation, Township and Village Enterprise reform, gradual opening to FDI and trade — produced a structural break in per-capita GDP growth rates.

China's demographic transition — driven by the legacy of the one-child policy (1980-2015), low post-relaxation fertility despite three-child policy (2021), and the realisation of the working-age-population peak around 2014-2015 — is now empirically visible in macro outcomes 2020-2024.

China's local-government-financing-vehicle (LGFV) debt expansion 2015-2024 — driven by post-2015 credit easing, infrastructure stimulus to offset property weakness, and 2020-2022 COVID fiscal response — produced a structural rise in non-financial-corporate debt-to-GDP and a generalised public-sector debt-to-GDP increase that is observable in BIS credit aggregates and IMF general-government debt series.

China's "Made in China 2025" industrial-policy programme (announced May 2015, targeting 10 priority sectors with subsidies, state-directed investment, and indigenous-innovation procurement) produced measurable capability gains in manufacturing value-added share, high-tech export share, and R&D intensity from 2015 to 2024 — but did not break the global manufacturing-value-added share growth trend already in place pre-2015.

Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.

Across countries 2000-2022, higher WGI Political Stability (PV.EST) and Rule of Law (RL.EST) jointly predict higher subsequent FDI inflows as a share of GDP, conditional on initial income, market size, openness, and natural-resource rents.

Pre-1945 colonial institutions explain a significant share of post-independence per-capita GDP variation; former colonies with settler/inclusive institutions outperform extractive-institution former colonies.

More competitive telecom markets predict lower internet prices, faster broadband penetration, and smaller urban-rural digital gaps.

Across advanced and middle-income economies 1990-2020, stronger antitrust and competition-policy enforcement — measured by merger- control intensity, cartel fines per GDP, and competition-authority staffing — predicts higher subsequent patent quality (forward citations per patent) and total-factor-productivity growth over 20-year windows.

Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.

Corbyn 2017-2019 Labour programme (rail/utility renationalisation, expanded NHS) did not produce the capital-flight or fiscal-collapse outcomes predicted by market-liberal critics in the 2017 and 2019 manifestos' IFS-modelled scenarios.

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, state allocation of resources — measured by government consumption share, state- enterprise share of output, and public-investment share — has negative long-run effects on total-factor-productivity growth when corruption is high (WGI Control of Corruption below median), but neutral or positive effects when corruption is low (above median).

State ownership has negative growth effects where corruption is high and neutral or mixed effects where governance is strong.

Costa Rica's 1980-2024 development path — universal-health system (CCSS, established 1941, expanded), abolition of military 1948, large public-education investment, FDI promotion via free-zone regime (CINDE 1982, Intel 1996, medical-devices cluster 2000+), and central-bank-led inflation targeting since 2018 — produced a measurable life-expectancy and human-development premium relative to Central American peers while sustaining mid-quartile cumulative growth.

Abolition of state cotton marketing boards predicts higher output and yield growth relative to state monopsony regimes.

Cryptocurrency adoption is highest in countries with capital controls, high inflation, and weak property-rights protection, serving as a market-discovered money substitute.

Following the July 2021 protests (largest mass demonstrations in Cuba since 1959), the Cuban government enacted incremental economic reforms: legalisation of small/medium private enterprises (MIPYME, August 2021), partial dual-currency unification (Tarea Ordenamiento followed through), expansion of MLC (USD-denominated) retail circuits, and adjustment of official FX rates.

If Cuba's socialist health-system superiority story really travels beyond a friendly regional pool, Cuba should remain at least mid-pack against a small advanced-market subgroup of non-socialist health performers by 2000; if it ranks near the bottom even after adjusting expectations for lower income, the universal version of the Marxist-Leninist claim is overstated.

Cuban life expectancy and infant mortality outcomes 1960-2000 outperformed Latin American middle-income peers despite sanctions, demonstrating socialist health-system superiority.

Cuba's life expectancy and infant mortality outcomes by 2000 were strong enough to rank competitively not just against Latin American peers, but against a broad ex-ante fixed pool of non-Latin-American market economies; if Cuba fails that harder comparison, the "socialist health-system superiority" story is more regional than universal.

Cuba's post-1959 socialist policy regime (Castro 1959-2008 + Raúl 2008-2018 + Díaz-Canel 2018-present, characterised by single-party rule, state ownership of most productive assets, ration-card consumption, FX duality, and chronic suppression of private enterprise) produced a canonical 60-year material stagnation that manifests as ≥7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer.

Cuban post-1991 Special Period shows that socialist planning can maintain health and education outputs under severe external shock better than market economies of similar GDP per capita.

The long-run prosperity gap between the Czech Republic and Slovakia since their 1993 dissolution is better explained by divergence in market institutions and FDI openness than by state-led industrial strategy.

Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.

Canada's points-based immigration system (introduced 1967, enhanced 2002 IRPA) selects on human capital and produces a foreign-born workforce with above-average tertiary attainment.

The Chinese one-child policy (1980-2015) produced a measurable long-run drag on per-capita growth in the post-2010 period via accelerated working-age decline and a higher dependency ratio than counterfactual fertility paths would predict.

Korea, Taiwan, and Ireland's rapid higher-education expansion (tertiary attainment rising from <15% to >50% of working-age cohorts within roughly 30 years) is associated with measurable acceleration in per-capita output growth in these countries, particularly pronounced in the high-tech-export-share component.

India's demographic transition 1990-2050 was projected (UN-DESA 1990s/2000s) to deliver a large dividend to per-capita growth.

Italy and Spain 1995-2023 exhibit a coupled demographic-growth stagnation: sustained sub-replacement fertility (TFR ~1.2-1.4) since the 1980s feeds into post-2008 working-age contraction, which decomposes as a substantial share of the post-2008 per-capita growth shortfall vs the EU-15 median.

Japan's de facto policy of refusing large-scale immigration through the 1990s-2010s, in combination with its rapid ageing, produced a working-age population contraction larger than any major OECD comparator.

In countries with major migrant-corridor remittance dependency (Philippines, Bangladesh, Honduras, Nepal, where remittances exceed 6% of GDP for sustained periods), remittances smooth household consumption but are associated with reduced domestic labour-force participation (Dutch-disease-via-labour) and elevated reservation wages.

Sub-Saharan Africa's demographic-dividend window (defined as the period of rising working- age share following fertility transition) opened for most countries 2000-2020 and is projected to extend through 2050.

The "demographic dividend" hypothesis: across countries 1960-2023, increases in the working-age population share (15-64) are associated with elevated real GDP per capita growth, with a 1-percentage-point rise in working-age share predicting roughly 0.3-0.5 percentage-point higher annualised per-capita growth, after controlling for capital deepening, education, and institutions.

Deregulation episodes (US transportation 1978–1980, UK telecoms 1984, NZ Rogernomics 1984–1993) show measurable TFP gains in the deregulated sectors within a decade.

Developmentalist policy packages show positive growth effects mainly in low-income catch-up windows, while the same packages show weaker or null effects in upper-middle-income and high-income windows unless market competition improves.

Diaspora return rates (returning emigrants as a share of the stock of emigrants abroad) rise after credible market and property-rights reforms in origin countries, controlling for income growth and political stability.

The Dominican Republic's 1980-2024 development path combined an early free-zone regime (Law 4315 of 1955; expanded under Balaguer and especially under the 1990s textile boom), a sustained tourism- buildout (Punta Cana, Bávaro, Puerto Plata), and a Mirex-led remittance-receiving migrant infrastructure to deliver cumulative log GDP-per-capita growth in the top quartile of the Caribbean and top half of Latin America.

East Asian high-performing economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong) achieved superior long-run total factor productivity and manufacturing productivity growth because export-market discipline forced competitive efficiency and technology upgrading, whereas economies that relied on protected domestic industrial policy without rigorous export exposure (Malaysia, Thailand in select sectors) experienced weaker long-run productivity.

Rule-bound market-compatible institutions predict lower political corruption where legal constraints reduce discretionary exchange.

Economic-freedom indices (Fraser, Heritage) correlate positively with per-capita income levels across countries, with the strongest sub-indices being legal-system and sound-money.

Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger personal-freedom and voice-and-accountability proxies.

Market-compatible institutional quality predicts education-related quality-of-life gains across broad samples.

Greater trade openness predicts higher education participation and quality proxies over long windows.

School-autonomy and governance-quality proxies predict education gains beyond income levels alone.

El Salvador's homicide rate fell from 52 per 100,000 (2019) to 2.4 per 100,000 (2023) — a 95% reduction — under Bukele's Estado de Excepción security crackdown beginning March 2022.

In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, electricity-market liberalisation episodes (vertical unbundling of generation/transmission/distribution, introduction of wholesale markets, and retail competition) predict lower industrial electricity prices and equal or improved system reliability (lower outage frequency/duration), controlling for fuel mix, generation capacity, and income level.

Cooperative-sector firms in northern Italy (Emilia-Romagna) sustained employment through the 2008-2012 recession at rates higher than matched private-sector firms of similar size.

The 2022 European gas-price shock plus heterogeneous national policy responses (German Doppelwumms ~€200bn relief package, Spanish-Portuguese Iberian gas-price-cap mechanism, Italian energy-aid bridges, French EDF nationalisation + nuclear price cap) produced a divergent industrial- relocation pattern within Europe and across the Atlantic over 2022-2025.

ESOP (employee-stock-ownership) firms in the US post-1974 ERISA show higher survival rates and comparable productivity to matched conventional firms.

Estonia’s radical market reforms after independence in 1991 — including a currency board, flat tax, rapid privatisation, and full trade liberalisation — generated a cumulative GDP-per-capita convergence gain of at least 15 log-points by 2024 relative to a synthetic counterfactual constructed from gradual post-Soviet reform comparators (Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan).

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

Higher real exchange-rate volatility predicts shorter investment horizons and lower capital intensity in tradable sectors.

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, higher expropriation risk — measured by ICRG expropriation risk index, Heritage investment-freedom score, and political-risk ratings — predicts shorter investment horizons (higher share of short-term investment, lower share of structures and machinery) and lower capital intensity in tradable sectors.

FDI openness predicts domestic supplier total factor productivity growth when paired with pro-competition domestic policy, but not when domestic markets are reserved for protected national champions, in a panel of emerging economies 1990-2020.

FDI openness predicts domestic supplier productivity growth when paired with competition, but not when paired with protected national champions.

Financial deepening predicts growth up to a threshold; beyond it, credit booms predict crisis risk that offsets deepening gains.

Post-2010 Southern-European departures from euro fiscal rules (Greece 2001–2009) produced the specific pattern Ordoliberal theory predicts: credibility loss, borrowing-cost spikes, and forced stabilisation on worse terms than voluntary rule-compliance would have produced.

Countries with stronger market-institution scores around 1960 were more likely to remain in, or converge into, the high-income frontier by 2024 than countries with weaker property rights and heavier state-directed allocation, after controlling for initial GDP per capita.

Market-compatible institutional quality predicts higher frontier quality-of-life levels.

Among high-income and near-frontier economies from 1970 to 2024, lower product-market regulation, stronger competition, and stronger property rights predict higher long-run TFP growth than state ownership or targeted industrial-policy intensity.

Wellbeing-indicator measures (life satisfaction, ISEW/GPI, HDI) diverge from GDP per capita above roughly $25-35k per capita, indicating that further growth delivers diminishing welfare returns in rich economies.

Global value chain (GVC) participation predicts real GDP per capita income upgrading when firms can enter and exit freely, but not when rents are reserved for protected incumbents, in a panel of developing and emerging economies 1990-2020.

Countries permitting GM crop cultivation without prolonged moratoria experienced faster agricultural yield convergence than ban or delay countries.

Deng's 1978 reforms succeeded not through pure market liberalisation but through dual-track pricing, TVE experimentation, and SEZ strategic openings — a gradualist-pragmatist pattern that pure shock-therapy could not reproduce in post-Soviet economies.

Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), characterised by forced collectivisation into People's Communes, Lysenkoist rejection of scientific agronomy, diversion of rural labour to backyard steel production, and cadre-competition-driven inflation of reported harvests, produced a canonical institutional-economic collapse that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source or methodology family and measuring a different causal layer (demographic mortality, agricultural output, macroeconomic contraction, institutional coverage, human capital).

Guyana's 2015 Liza-1 discovery (and subsequent Stabroek-block developments through 2024) and Suriname's 2020 Block-58 discoveries produced one of the most extreme oil-and-gas-windfall growth events on record.

In post-1992 China, sectors and provinces with persistently high state-owned-enterprise (SOE) shares of fixed-asset investment exhibit lower TFP growth and higher incremental capital-output ratios (ICOR — capital used per unit of additional output) than sectors and provinces dominated by private firms, after controlling for sector composition, urbanisation, and human capital.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.

Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.

Hong Kong's long-run income convergence to the productivity frontier without classic industrial policy (sectoral targeting, directed credit, national champions, or SOE promotion) matches or exceeds that of developmentalist East Asian comparators after controlling for initial income, human capital, and trade openness.

China's agricultural output growth accelerated after the household responsibility system replaced collective farming, relative to comparable middle-income reform peers.

Every documented hyperinflation episode since 1900 (Weimar Germany, post-WW2 Hungary, Yugoslavia 1990s, Zimbabwe 2000s, Venezuela 2010s-2020s, among others) was preceded by fiscal dominance — a state of affairs where monetary policy is subordinated to financing government deficits that cannot be financed by taxation or market-rate borrowing.

India's 1991 balance-of-payments-crisis-driven liberalisation programme (Manmohan Singh's package: rupee devaluation, industrial delicensing, trade liberalisation, FDI opening, partial financial- sector reform) produced a sustained acceleration in per-capita GDP growth.

India's digital public infrastructure stack — Aadhaar (universal biometric ID, 2009-2016 build-out), UPI (Unified Payments Interface launched 2016), and the JAM trinity (Jan Dhan accounts + Aadhaar + Mobile) — produced productivity gains visible in formal-sector employment, financial-inclusion measures, and government-to-person transfer leakage reduction.

Indigenous-managed territories (documented across Amazon basin, Canadian First Nations, Australian Indigenous Protected Areas) retain higher biodiversity and lower deforestation than state-protected or privately-held land of matched biome.

Indigenous-managed parcels in the Amazon basin (BRA, PER, COL, ECU, BOL), Canadian First-Nations comanagement areas, and Australian Indigenous Protected Areas retain at least 20% more above-ground biomass per hectare than biome-matched state- protected and private parcels over 2003-2023, after controlling for slope, accessibility, and pre-treatment biome composition.

Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.

Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved higher long-run real per-capita GDP growth over 1960-2019 than otherwise-comparable countries starting at similar income levels in 1960.

Industrial policy (sectoral targeting, export subsidies, conditional credit, technology push) succeeds in raising long-run manufacturing productivity and export sophistication when implemented in high-governance states with export discipline (clear performance criteria, sunset clauses, competitive benchmarking), over 30-year windows 1960-2020.

Industrial policy episodes without clear exit rules or export-discipline conditions generate weaker long-run GDP-per-capita and productivity outcomes than episodes with hard performance conditions, in a broad panel of economies during 1970-2020.

Privatised infrastructure with regulated third-party access shows lower operating costs and higher investment than state operation.

High-technology diffusion predicts stronger income and quality-of-life spillovers over long windows.

Higher discretionary intervention burden proxies predict weaker long-run prosperity growth over broad windows.

Where corruption control is weak, heavier state intervention predicts weaker quality-of-life gains.

Stronger rule-of-law and IP-protection proxies predict stronger high-technology diffusion and innovation outputs.

Ireland’s long-run convergence from a middle-income to a high-income economy during 1987–2024 is better predicted by trade openness, tax competitiveness, and FDI entry than by classic industrial planning.

Judicial independence predicts stronger investment growth, especially in contract-intensive sectors (finance, business services, complex manufacturing).

Stronger rule-of-law proxies strengthen quality-of-life and income outcomes under market institutions.

Pre-1945 Keynes-era claims that growth would ease 'economic problem' within a century (Keynes 1930 'Possibilities for Our Grandchildren') are, by 2030, technically met in OECD per-capita output terms, inviting the degrowth reframing question.

Korean division 1945-present delivers a natural experiment: matched populations, geography, pre-war institutions; post-war institutional divergence explains the roughly 20x GDP-per-capita gap.

Colombia's 2002 Uribe-government labour reform (Law 789: working-day extension, overtime/holiday-premium reduction, dismissal-cost cuts) reduced the Colombian unemployment rate by at least 2 pp by 2007 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with formal-sector employment gaining and informality not worsening.

Peru's 2008 MYPE (micro/small-enterprise) special labour regime extension (Legislative Decree 1086: reduced labour obligations, simplified social-security access for small firms) raised the formal-employment share among MYPE workers by at least 4 pp by 2013 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, without producing a measurable wage decline at the median.

Vietnam's 2019 Labour Code revision (Law 45/2019/QH14: retirement-age increase, multiple-trade-union recognition, working-time provisions, dispute-resolution reform) effective 2021-Q1 raised the Vietnamese formal-employment share by at least 1.5 pp by 2024 relative to a synthetic control of ASEAN peers, with the largest gains in foreign- invested manufacturing.

Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.

Stronger rule-of-law and property-rights proxies predict higher investment rates and neighborhood-upgrading capacity.

Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).

Across Latin American economies 1990-2024, the cross-country gradient of capital-account openness (Chinn-Ito-style index proxied by Foreign-direct-investment-share-of-GDP plus external-debt-stock-share-of-GNI as available signals) correlates positively with cumulative real-GDP-per-capita growth and negatively with macro volatility, but conditionally on institutional quality (WGI).

Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador resource-nationalisation programmes 2000-2015 financed measurable social-outcome gains (poverty reduction, literacy) despite extractive-output costs, a Pareto-dominance structure depending on normative weighting.

Across countries 1990-2020, higher capital-account openness (proxied by EFW area-4 freedom-to-trade-internationally sub- components covering capital controls, plus IMF AREAER-derived binary capital-control intensity where available) predicts higher subsequent 10-year real per-capita GDP growth, conditional on initial income, rule-of-law level, trade openness, and financial- development depth.

Across cross-country liberalisation episodes since 1971 (trade opening, product-market deregulation, state-owned-enterprise divestiture, financial account liberalisation), output growth follows the reform rather than preceding it — i.e.

Countries with higher sustained market-institution scores from 1970 to 2024 experienced stronger convergence in real household consumption per capita toward the US frontier than countries with weaker market scores.

Maoist China's 1949-1976 infrastructure and literacy expansion produced the human-capital base that enabled post-1978 reform growth; pre-1978 development was a precondition, not a failure.

Countries with market-driven land conversion and migration show faster urban productivity growth and less informal slum expansion.

Countries with flexible exchange rates recover faster from external shocks than countries with fixed but unsustainable pegs.

Countries with market-determined exchange rates closer to purchasing-power parity show stronger trade-volume growth than countries with sustained overvaluation.

Market-compatible institutions predict governance quality and quality-of-life outcomes jointly across broad samples.

Market-led income growth predicts higher school completion over 20-year windows.

Stronger market-compatible institutions predict stronger material-wellbeing resilience and income growth.

Market openness (trade and capital-account liberalisation) without complementary adjustment institutions (active labour-market policy, regional transfers, wage insurance, retraining) raises inequality or regional divergence enough to trigger policy reversal (tariff increases, capital controls, populist economic platforms) within 10-15 years.

Higher trade and investment openness predicts stronger long-run prosperity gains.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more open capital accounts predict higher FDI inflows as a share of GDP after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger control of corruption predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger control of corruption predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict higher employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

Market-oriented reform episodes that persist for at least twenty years produce more durable GDP-per-capita and productivity gains than short reform bursts or state-led industrial-policy episodes without sustained market competition.

Market-oriented reform episodes lasting 15+ years predict stronger GDP-per-capita persistence into subsequent decades than interrupted or reversed reforms.

Market-oriented reforms (trade liberalisation, privatisation, price decontrol) implemented in countries with weak state capacity (low WGI government effectiveness, low tax revenue as % of GDP, weak contract enforcement) fail to produce sustained long-run prosperity compared to similar reforms in high-capacity settings.

Swedish Meidner plan / wage-earner funds 1984-1991 did not produce measurable capital flight during their brief implementation, falsifying claims that citizen ownership funds trigger disinvestment.

Egypt's three sequential currency-regime devaluations (November 2016, March 2022, March 2024) each followed a recurring pattern: an FX-shortage crisis, an IMF-anchored devaluation step, a brief inflation surge, and a partial reserve rebuild.

Egypt's 2014-onwards Sisi-era macro stabilisation (2016-2019 IMF EFF programme, energy- subsidy reform 2014-2019, mega-project investment programme, sequential currency devaluations) delivered headline-fiscal-deficit reduction and per-capita-GDP-growth acceleration over 2014-2019, but the post-2020 trajectory shows reversal: external- debt accumulation, recurring FX crises, military-economic-footprint expansion, and a growth model heavily dependent on Gulf bailouts.

The UAE's 1990-2024 diversification trajectory — Dubai's services / logistics / finance / tourism build-out, Abu Dhabi's hydrocarbon-anchored sovereign-wealth model, free-zone proliferation (DIFC, ADGM, JAFZA) — produced the most successful Gulf transition from hydrocarbon-rent dependency, visible in non-oil-GDP share, services-export composition, and tourism / aviation hub metrics.

Middle-class wealth accumulation (median household net worth growth, homeownership rates, and financial-asset participation) is stronger in countries with deeper capital markets (stock-market capitalisation to GDP, private credit to GDP) and more secure property rights (WGI rule of law, Heritage property-rights score) than in peers at similar income levels with shallow financial systems or weak tenure security, over 1990-2020.

Mitterrand's 1981–1983 French nationalisations reduced productivity and required the 1983 'tournant de la rigueur' reversal, vindicating the classical-liberal diagnosis that political ownership distorts resource allocation.

Mitterrand 1981-1983 nationalisations of banking and industry did not produce the predicted efficiency collapse in the nationalised firms relative to private peers during their nationalised years, though macro outcomes were affected by FX pressure.

Mondragón cooperative network (Spain, 1956-present) has sustained productivity and employment stability through successive recessions at levels comparable to Basque private-sector peers.

In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, mortgage-market liberalisation episodes (abolition of interest-rate caps, reduction of down-payment requirements, privatisation of state mortgage banks, and introduction of securitisation) predict higher homeownership rates, higher residential investment as a share of GDP, and lower housing-rent-to-income ratios, controlling for income growth, demographic structure, and urbanisation.

Sectoral nationalisation produces a three-order causal chain.

Privatisation of natural monopolies (electricity transmission, water distribution, rail infrastructure, fixed-line telecommunications) without strong independent regulation fails to improve long-run consumer welfare compared to well-governed public ownership or regulated private provision.

Net migration flows per 1,000 population across countries 1990-2020 are positively associated with stronger market institutions (higher Economic Freedom of the World composite, lower OECD PMR product-market regulation, and stronger rule of law), after controlling for per-capita income level, common language networks, and proximity to armed conflict.

New Zealand’s 1984–1993 liberalisation (deregulation, tariff cuts, privatisation, inflation targeting, and fiscal consolidation) improved long-run macroeconomic stability and tradables-sector productivity over 1984–2024 relative to a synthetic counterfactual of OECD small open economies, but aggregate economy-wide labour productivity and TFP did not improve enough to support strong market-optimism claims.

From a comparable (arguably DPRK-favoured) 1953 armistice starting point — same ethnicity, language, pre-colonial institutional inheritance, and a Japanese colonial industrial capital stock disproportionately located in the North — the Republic of Korea's market economy with state-directed industrial policy and export discipline, versus the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's autarkic central planning under Juche, produced by 2023 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.

Lula third-term's Nova Indústria Brasil 2024 industrial-policy package, conditioned on export performance and technology-diffusion metrics, produces measurable sectoral capability gains (semiconductors, green hydrogen, health-industrial complex) by 2030 — replicating the East Asian export-discipline conditionality pattern rather than the earlier Latin American import-substitution-industrialisation pattern.

Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain.

The 2022-2026 window saw rhetorical and policy-stated revival of Western large-scale nuclear power: France committed to EPR2 fleet (6 + 8 reactors by 2050) under loi accélération du nucléaire 2023; UK confirmed Sizewell C investment FID 2024 + Small Modular Reactor (SMR) competitive selection 2024-2025; US Vogtle Unit 4 commercial start July 2024 + several SMR / advanced-reactor licensing applications; Japan re-pivoted to nuclear restart + lifetime extension (2023 GX framework permits >60-year operation); Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium reversed phase-out policies.

NZ Rogernomics 1984–1993 liberalisation (tariff removal, SOE corporatisation, financial-market liberalisation) produced productivity acceleration and real-income gains over 1990s–2000s relative to pre-reform trend.

Countries with very large internet-use diffusion after 2000 should usually also show gains in average years of schooling, consistent with broader public-goods and capability expansion.

Countries that materially raise tax revenues as a share of GDP from 2000 to 2022 should usually also achieve large child-mortality reductions, consistent with state-capacity public-goods follow-through.

Forced-saving pension systems (mandatory defined-contribution or provident funds with significant asset accumulation) raise capital deepening (capital per worker) and support catch-up real GDP per worker growth in developing and emerging economies, but do not guarantee frontier total factor productivity growth, in a broad-country panel 1980-2020.

Peru's 1990-1995 Fujimori shock-therapy package (price liberalisation, fiscal stabilisation under the August 1990 "Fujishock", Brady-style external debt restructuring 1996-1997, large-scale privatisation of SOEs, central-bank independence under the 1993 constitution, and trade liberalisation) produced a structural break in inflation and real-GDP per capita relative to Peru's 1985-1990 hyperinflation trajectory and relative to a Latin American peer pool that did not adopt comparable packages on the same timeline.

Colombia's policy package under Petro (2022-2026) — tax reform raising marginal rates on high incomes and dividends, energy-transition policies signalling oil/coal sector contraction, pension reform proposal, and labour reform — produces measurable capital-flight indicators beyond the synthetic counterfactual: peso real depreciation, sovereign credit-spread widening, resident-deposit dollarisation, and net portfolio outflows.

Colombia's real GDP, FDI inflows, and peso exchange-rate trajectory from Petro's August 2022 inauguration through 2026 diverge negatively from a comparable-institutional-quality Latin American donor pool (Peru, Chile, Mexico) weighted to match Colombia's pre-treatment macroeconomic profile (GDP per capita, oil export share, central-bank-independence index, WGI rule-of-law score, inflation-target credibility).

Stringent pharmaceutical price controls predict fewer new drug launches and longer time-to-market for innovative therapies.

Pinochet-era Chile's rapid liberalisation programme (1973-1982) produced an initial growth collapse culminating in the 1975 recession and the 1982 banking-and-debt crisis, with sustained recovery only after selective state re-engagement (copper-sector re-nationalisation, Banco del Estado expansion, pension-system guarantee backstopping).

Poland’s sustained market transition — shock therapy stabilisation in 1990, competition-policy enforcement, mass privatisation, and EU regulatory adoption — generated a cumulative log GDP-per-capita growth advantage of at least 10 percentage points over 1990–2024 relative to CEE peers with weaker competition and slower privatisation (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia).

Across a broad panel of economies 1990-2020, higher policy uncertainty — measured by economic-policy-uncertainty (EPU) indices, election-frequency volatility, and regulatory-turnover rates — predicts lower private-investment shares of GDP and slower long-run total-factor-productivity growth in the years following state-led reform shifts.

Politicised development-bank lending that increases around election cycles predicts weaker subsequent total-factor-productivity growth and higher non-performing loan ratios in a broad panel of emerging and developing economies during 1990-2020.

Post-2008 OECD GDP growth has slowed to roughly 1-2% trend levels while per-capita emissions remain above 1.5C-consistent paths, falsifying the 'green growth will solve it' forecasts of 2005-2010 IPCC scenarios.

Following the 1989-1992 collapse of the Soviet bloc, post-communist countries that adopted market reforms rapidly (Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania — the "fast reformers") experienced faster recovery in life expectancy at birth than countries that reformed slowly or retained state-socialist economic structures (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan — the "slow reformers").

Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.

Agricultural output surges most sharply in years following price liberalisation and de-collectivisation, controlling for weather.

Mass-voucher privatisation predicts weaker long-run productivity than trade sales or management buyouts, but both outperform continued state ownership.

Thatcher-era UK privatisations (BT, British Gas, BA, water utilities) produced measurable productivity gains and price reductions in the privatised sectors, net of cost-shifting concerns.

In post-communist transition-economy panels 1990-2015, countries that implemented rapid mass-privatisation programmes (voucher privatisation, direct sales to insiders, and rapid SOE liquidation) experienced faster TFP growth recovery in the decade following reform than countries that pursued gradual or partial state-retention strategies, controlling for initial income, EU accession candidacy, and institutional quality.

In the US 1948-2023, the Marxian-defined real profit rate (corporate net operating surplus divided by the replacement-cost net stock of fixed capital, deflated) exhibits a secular declining trend with a structural break post-1973, consistent with the Dumenil-Levy and Shaikh long-wave readings.

Stronger property-rights protection predicts higher agricultural investment and faster yield growth, especially for tree crops and soil conservation.

Stronger rule of law and property rights predict lower child mortality over long windows.

Across a broad panel of economies 1960-2020, property-rights protection — measured by WGI Rule of Law, Fraser EFW legal-system and property-rights sub-index, and Heritage property-rights scores — predicts 40-year real income per capita growth more strongly than state investment share of GDP.

In a 1996-2018 Maddison/WGI cross-section, countries with stronger rule of law should show higher mean annual GDP-per-capita growth after controlling for initial income if the property-rights growth channel is strong in between-country variation.

Stronger rule-of-law and property-rights proxies predict higher long-run real income levels.

Stronger property rights and deeper credit markets predict broader long-run home access proxies.

Stronger rule-of-law and property-rights proxies predict higher control-of-corruption and social-trust governance outcomes.

Publicly owned electricity generators (EDF in France pre-privatisation, Vattenfall Sweden) achieved lower-carbon generation mixes than otherwise-matched privatised counterparts in the 1970s-1990s.

Public R&D spending (government and higher-education R&D) complements private-market innovation at the technology frontier, raising private patenting, total factor productivity, and venture-capital activity in sectors with high spillover potential (defence, health, general-purpose technologies).

Large public-sector wage premia predict lower private-sector formal employment and higher queueing for public jobs.

Post-1945 US and Western European public investment in rail/transit produced lower per-capita emissions than the post-1980 privatised-deregulated transport regime.

Broad-scope market-institution proxies predict higher long-run quality-of-life levels, reducing isolated anomaly weight.

Quality-adjusted real household consumption per capita grew faster in market-liberal economies than in state-directed peers over 30-year windows from 1960-2020, after controlling for initial income level, human capital, and demographic structure.

Regional trade agreements with regulatory-convergence chapters predict faster intra-bloc FDI and technology diffusion.

Stable rules-based regulation predicts higher cross-sector private investment and faster technology adoption than discretionary intervention.

Stronger regulatory quality predicts larger FDI productivity spillovers to domestic firms through supply-chain linkage.

Rent control predicts lower housing-supply elasticity, higher market rents for uncontrolled units, and longer commuting distances.

Nationalisation of producing oil, gas, and mining enterprises without preservation of operational autonomy reduces extractor output within 3–5 years of nationalisation and underperforms the counterfactual trajectory for at least a decade.

Across resource-rich economies with meaningful extractive sectors, countries that capture a high share of resource rents through sovereign-wealth-fund mechanisms, royalties, resource-specific taxes, or state-share equity (the "rent-capture" regime, anchored by Norway and Botswana) deliver better long-run welfare outcomes — GDP per capita PPP, life expectancy, gini disposable income, public-service quality — than comparable resource-rich economies that run a laissez-faire regime where rents are predominantly retained by private extractive firms (anchored by Australia LNG, pre-SWF Alaska oil, pre-reform Chilean copper).

Across countries 1996-2023, higher WGI Rule of Law (RL) scores predict higher subsequent real per-capita GDP growth, conditional on standard controls (initial income, investment share, trade openness, demographic composition).

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).

Post-1991 Russian mass privatisation produced worse output and distributional outcomes than the Chinese gradualist-with-retained-public-ownership path, controlling for initial conditions.

Malaysia's 1MDB scandal — public-fund misappropriation 2009-2015, international scandal exposure 2015-2018, Najib conviction 2020 — produced measurable institutional-quality damage observable in Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness scores, and an associated under-performance in real GDP-pc growth vs ASEAN-5 peer mean over 2015-2019.

Singapore's post-2014 FTA expansion — covering CECA upgrade with India (in-force 2005, modernised post-2014), CPTPP 2018, RCEP 2022 — sustained the export-share-of-GDP and trade-openness ratios at the world's highest levels, with exports of goods and services / GDP averaging at least 170% over 2015-2019 (vs 100-130% for global peers like NLD, BEL, IRL), and Singapore's real GDP-pc growth maintaining at least +0.3pp/yr differential vs the high-income East Asian peer panel (KOR, JPN, HKG) over 2014-2019.

Thailand's 2014 military coup and ensuing junta + 2017 constitutional reset under-performed peer ASEAN economies on per-capita GDP growth through 2019, and Thailand's heavy tourism-dependence (international tourism receipts ~12-18% of GDP pre-COVID) produced a sharper-than-peer contraction in 2020 and slower recovery through 2023.

Vietnam's post-1995 trajectory — building on the 1986 Doi Moi reforms through US trade-normalisation 1995, ASEAN accession 1995, BTA with the US 2001, WTO accession 2007, EVFTA 2020, and a deliberate FDI manufacturing-attraction strategy — produced sustained convergence to middle-income levels, with real GDP-per-capita (PPP) growth averaging at least 4.5 percentage points per year above the SE-Asian peer panel mean (PHL, IDN, KHM, LAO, BGD, MMR) over 1995-2019.

Services trade liberalisation predicts stronger total factor productivity growth in high-income frontier economies after 1990 than goods-sector industrial policy does.

Rogernomics (NZ) and Pinochet-era Chile produced positive macro outcomes because reforms were combined with strengthened institutions; same reforms without institutional strengthening (Russia 1990s) produced catastrophic outcomes.

Singapore's LKY-era industrial strategy worked through disciplined openness to foreign capital and manufacturing upgrading: FDI inflows were persistently high, FDI intensity exceeded regional peers, manufacturing value added rose sharply, and manufactured exports dominated by 1990.

Singapore's LKY-era market-rule and financial-hub trajectory produced deep private credit, large FDI intensity, and high market-rule scores by the modern endpoint, consistent with an open financial-services hub rather than a closed developmental state.

The LKY-era Singapore fiscal-market model combined high national savings, relatively low tax take, fiscal surpluses, and high economic/trade-freedom scores rather than relying on a large transfer state.

Singapore's post-LKY institutional legacy is visible in WGI data: control of corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law remain near the top of the regional peer set from 1996 to 2024.

Singapore's long-run prosperity and frontier convergence are better predicted by extreme trade openness, strong rule of law, competitive product and services markets, and high economic freedom than by state ownership or industrial targeting alone.

Singaporean state-holding-company model (Temasek, GIC) combines public ownership of commanding heights with competitive enterprise discipline, achieving sustained growth that falsifies the claim that all public ownership degrades efficiency.

Smallholder-dominant systems converge to higher long-run agricultural productivity than plantation-dominant systems after controlling for crop mix and land quality.

Right-to-buy and social-housing privatisation transfers predict higher household wealth accumulation than continued state ownership.

Collectivised agriculture in the USSR 1930-1940 raised grain marketings sufficiently to finance industrial investment, delivering Preobrazhensky's scissors-crisis resolution despite high rural transition costs.

Soviet industrial output grew faster than Western European averages during 1928-1940 under the first two Five-Year Plans, demonstrating primitive socialist accumulation's catch-up capacity.

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.

Spain's 2020 COVID lockdown generated a severe GDP shock and a meaningful unemployment rise, but the unemployment-rate increase was much smaller than the output collapse implied.

Spain's headline macroeconomic trajectory under the 2018-present PSOE-led governments is NOT uniformly worse than a peer euro-area donor pool, once euro-area-common shocks (COVID 2020-2021, 2022 energy shock, ECB rate cycle) are absorbed by year fixed effects.

Higher state-bank credit share predicts lower loan quality and weaker long-run TFP growth than private-bank-dominated systems.

Persistent state-directed credit allocation predicts higher zombie-firm shares and lower total-factor-productivity growth over 15-30 year windows in a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies.

State-led five-year planning economies show faster initial growth but sharper fade after 25 years than market economies with similar initial human capital.

State commodity-marketing boards capture lower farm-gate prices and show more rent-seeking than private auction markets.

Higher state-owned enterprise shares predict slower long-run labour-productivity growth once basic infrastructure, literacy, and initial income gaps are controlled in a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies during 1980-2020.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker voice-and-accountability and information-quality proxies.

Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker quality-of-life and income gains after controlling for initial income.

Export-processing zones with market-compatible rules show stronger export and employment growth than zones with heavy state direction and local-content requirements.

Taiwan's long-run total factor productivity performance is better predicted by small-and-medium-enterprise (SME) density, export-market discipline, and product-market competition intensity than by direct state planning or state-owned-enterprise (SOE) share.

Higher tax complexity predicts larger tax-advisory and avoidance industries and lower productive investment share.

Broader tax-treaty networks predict higher bilateral FDI flows and stronger productivity spillovers to domestic suppliers.

Strict local-content or technology-transfer requirements on FDI slow high-tech productivity convergence over long windows.

Greater trade openness predicts stronger productivity and income growth through technology import channels.

Mandatory technology-transfer requirements on foreign investors predict lower subsequent domestic R&D and fewer high-quality patents.

Thailand's middle-income plateau (post-1997 and especially post-2005) is associated with weaker product-market competition, lower institutional quality, and fragmented state coordination capacity relative to East Asian peers that sustained convergence.

China's WTO accession (2001-12-11) triggered a structural acceleration in Chinese merchandise-export intensity and manufacturing value-added relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of large emerging economies that did not accede to the WTO on the same date.

The 2004 EU eastern enlargement (CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN; plus CYP, MLT) produced an income-convergence acceleration relative to non-acceding Eastern European and CIS comparators.

Trade openness predicts higher real household consumption over long windows.

Unilateral trade liberalisation predicts faster manufacturing productivity growth through import competition and export discipline.

The UAE's Jebel Ali and free-zone strategy produced a highly open trade and investment platform by Gulf standards: trade intensity is high, exceeds the GCC peer median, FDI intensity has become material, and trade-freedom scores remain high.

Universal Basic Services provision (UK post-war, Nordic) delivers equivalent wellbeing outcomes to consumption-based equivalents at lower material-throughput levels.

UK post-1979 institutional reform (Bank of England independence 1997, competition-authority strengthening, privatisation regulatory frameworks) contributed to 1992-2007 macro stability more than the policy content alone.

UK post-1945 Attlee reforms (NHS, nationalisation of coal/rail/steel, expanded public housing) delivered measurable improvements in life expectancy and child mortality without undermining subsequent 1950s-1960s growth.

UK electricity-sector privatisation post-1989 increased per-MWh retail prices and did not accelerate decarbonisation relative to the public counterfactual until state-directed renewables mandates post-2008.

The UK's September 1992 ERM exit was followed by a rapid real-output rebound and disinflation, while unemployment lagged the recovery rather than improving immediately.

UK post-war nationalised industries (coal, rail, steel, gas) through 1979 achieved capital-investment rates comparable to sectoral peers in West Germany and France, falsifying the claim that public ownership categorically starves investment.

The UK labour share of national income fell during the Thatcher era (1979-1990) by a magnitude not explained by sectoral composition shifts alone.

UK market reforms from 1979 onward — privatisation, trade liberalisation, labour-market deregulation, and competition-policy strengthening — predict stronger long-run services-sector productivity and employment performance over 1979–2024 than comparable European corporatist regimes (France, Germany, Italy).

Countries that cut tariffs unilaterally show larger consumption welfare gains than countries that maintained protection, even without reciprocity.

Venezuela's post-1999 socialist policy regime (Chávez 1999-2013 + Maduro 2013-present, characterised by FX controls, price controls, mass nationalisations, PDVSA politicisation, and 2014+ monetary financing of fiscal deficits) produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse that manifests as ≥7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer.

Venezuela's post-1999 GDP per capita trajectory diverges strongly negatively from a commodity-exporter Latin American donor pool (Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Brazil) matched on pre-1999 outcome levels.

Vietnam's post-Doi Moi economic growth (1986-2020) is more strongly associated with private-sector enterprise entry, trade openness, and market-oriented reforms than with state-owned-enterprise (SOE) expansion or continued state direction.

Argentine Menem-era rapid privatisation and opening 1991–2001 produced a decade of growth followed by collapse — underperforming the comparable-size Korean developmental-state path.

Countries with large electricity-access gains from 1990 to 2023 should usually record substantial gains in life expectancy over the same period.

Countries with large electricity-access gains from 1990 to 2023 should usually show large under-5 mortality reductions over the same development window.

High-remittance economies should often show non-negative average private-consumption growth across the global shock years 2009, 2020, and 2021.

High-remittance economies should more often than not avoid negative average real GDP-per-capita growth across the global shock years 2009, 2020, and 2021.

Large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should generally be compatible with positive average real GDP-per-capita growth.

Countries with large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should usually register sizable growth in output per worker.

Countries with large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should usually show a visible shift of employment toward services.

Chile's 1981 pension privatisation (replacing PAYG with mandatory individual AFP accounts under Decreto Ley 3500) delivered domestic-savings-rate persistence near 20% of GDP through 1985-2010 and capital-deepening above LatAm peers, but produced median replacement rates below 40% by 2010-2020 due to coverage gaps among informal workers, motivating the 2008 solidarity-pillar addition (Pilar Solidario) and the ongoing 2019-2024 reform debate.

Australia's Cashless Debit Card trial (2016-2022, restricting 80% of welfare payments to non-cash spending in trial regions Ceduna, East Kimberley, Goldfields, Bundaberg/Hervey Bay) did not produce measurable reductions in alcohol-related hospitalisation, gambling spend, or domestic-violence reporting relative to a synthetic-control of comparable remote/rural regions, supporting the empirical critique that paternalistic conditionality on welfare delivery has limited demonstrable outcome effects against its stated objectives.

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.

Across country-years, higher WGI Regulatory Quality predicts higher average FDI net inflows as a share of GDP over the next three years after fixed effects and macro controls.

Worker cooperative conversions (US Main Street Employee Ownership Act 2018, Italian Marcora Law 1985) preserve employment in firms that would otherwise close.

WTO accession predicts total factor productivity (TFP) growth spillovers through increased import competition and expanded export market access, especially in episodes where domestic entry barriers also fall, in a panel of accession and non-accession countries 1995-2020.

Honduras under Xiomara Castro repealed the ZEDE (Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico — charter-city / special-economic-zone) framework in April 2022, immediately after taking office.

Yugoslav worker-self-managed firms 1965-1980 achieved productivity growth comparable to southern European market peers at similar development stages, demonstrating that self-management can coexist with market allocation.

Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).

Zimbabwean land reform 2000-2008 redistributed ownership to previously excluded populations; the inflation crisis was driven by external sanctions and fiscal-military pressures, not by the redistributive policy itself.

Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.